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 2 
ABSTRACT 
 
The 1966 Australian Federal Election is unique in Australian history, in that it is the only 
Federal Election where issues of domestic policy were largely ignored in favour of debate 
over foreign policy. This thesis explores the issue which dominated 1966, the American 
Alliance. The Alliance was able to affect debate on the Australian use of conscripts in the 
Vietnam War as well as creating considerable friction in the Australian Labor Party. In 
addition the American Alliance created an environment which saw the first American 
President visit Australia, a visit and relationship which was exploited by both sides of 
politics. 
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 5 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
„I like to come out and look my Prime Ministers over.‟1 
 
During his October 1966 Australian visit American President Lyndon Baines Johnson (LBJ) 
made a comment to his Australian counterpart, Prime Minster Harold Holt, which sounded 
awfully familiar. This statement of „owning‟ a Prime Minister seemed as though it would be 
better suited to have come from the monarch of the UK. Naturally LBJ‟s comment was meant 
to be taken with a grain of salt, as some kind joke. But his „joke‟ was very telling; suggesting 
that in 1966 America had gained enough influence over Australia to be able to „claim‟ the 
country in one way or another. What is more interesting is that this comment came only a 
month before the Australian Federal Election of 1966, which raises the question, was an 
American President able to influence the outcome of an Australian election? Past scholarship 
has certainly been devoted to exploring the effect LBJ‟s visit had on the election outcome, 
historians such as Paul Williams, Louise Overacker and Paul Ham have all explored the 
concept. But what has not been explored is the overall effect of the American Alliance on the 
1966 Australian Federal Election. This is certainly an important concept which must be 
examined, as LBJ‟s visit was a symptom of the Australia-American relationship, not a cause. 
Even the most comprehensive examination of Australian diplomacy during the late 1960s, 
Peter Edwards A Nation at War (the Australian War Memorial‟s officially sanctioned history 
of Australian involvement in Indochina) fails to examine the effects of the American Alliance 
on the 1966 election in depth. 
 
                                                 
1
 Pemberton, Gregory. All The Way, Australia’s road to Vietnam (North Sydney: Allen & Unwin Australia Pty 
Ltd, 1987), p.335. 
 6 
This thesis examines the significant effects of the American Alliance upon the Australian 
Federal Election of 1966,  the first election fought predominantly on issues of foreign rather 
than domestic policy.
2
 Contested against the background of growing Australian military 
commitments in Indochina, 1966 focused on the twin issues of the Vietnam War and 
conscription, which were both linked to the Australian relationship with America under the 
Australian, New Zealand and United States Security Treaty (hereby ANZUS).
3
 With this 
alliance came, according to the Australian Government lead by the Liberal Country Party 
coalition (LCP), a new set of responsibilities in regards to defensive policy. Consequently the 
Australian Government presented its relationship with America as the primary reason for 
increasing Australia‟s military presence in Vietnam – an increase which, according to Prime 
Minister Harold Holt, could only be facilitated through conscription. This reasoning and the 
LCP growing dependence on America for its foreign policy stance were serious points of 
contention for the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and particularly for its leader Arthur 
Calwell.   
 
The American Alliance impacted upon the 1966 Election in three major ways. Firstly the 
Alliance appeared heavily during the conscription debate. Chapter two of this thesis will deal 
with this debate, and examine how the LCP used the American Alliance to promote 
conscription. The LCP‟s argument rested on idea that backing America‟s (and to a lesser 
extent South Vietnam) military commitment in Vietnam only if adequate numbers of 
Australians volunteered for the armed forces, would reflect poorly on Australia.
4
 
 
                                                 
2
 Any subsequent references to the 1966 election refer to the Australian Federal Election of 1966. 
3As this thesis will be exploring the effect of the American component of ANZUS on the 1966 election it should 
be noted that any references to the „American Alliance‟ are referring to the ANZUS treaty. The phrase 
American Alliance is being used to avoid confusion, as unless otherwise stated the thesis is dealing exclusively 
with the American aspect of ANZUS.  
4
 McEwen, John. 16 November 1966, Vietnam, A.B.C Radio: National, p.2. 
 7 
The ALP‟s objection to conscription was based on their firm belief that the conflict occurring 
in Vietnam was not a case of one nation invading another but an instance of civil war. 
Calwell had first announced the ALP stance on Vietnam in 1965, declaring that:  
 
„The war in South Vietnam is a civil war, aided and abetted by the North Vietnamese 
Government, but neither created nor principally maintained by it. To call it simply 
“foreign aggression” as the Prime Minister does, and as his colleagues do, is to 
misrepresent the facts and, thereby, confuse the issue with which we must ultimately 
come to terms.‟5  
 
Sending conscripted troops to die in a foreign civil war was in the eyes of Calwell grossly 
immoral. Consequently the ALP‟s anti conscription push during the 1966 election was based 
around this idea. The need to keep the American Alliance strong in order to protect Australia 
was used by the LCP to circumnavigate the ALP‟s anti-conscription position.  
 
The second appearance of the American Alliance during the 1966 Election, and the focus of 
the third chapter of this thesis, was in the infighting of the ALP. During the election period 
Calwell and his deputy Gough Whitlam (as well as various other ALP members) were unable 
to maintain unity over the issue of Australian involvement in Vietnam. Calwell maintained 
that all Australian troops would be brought home if the ALP won the election, whilst 
Whitlam informed voters that regulars (non-conscripted members of the armed forces) would 
remain in South Vietnam.
6
 The LCP was able to convince voters that the inability of the ALP 
to maintain Party unity demonstrated that they would struggle to maintain the strength of 
Australia‟s alliances.  
                                                 
5
 Calwell, Arthur. Hansard, House of Representatives, 4 May 1965, p.1103. 
6
 The Liberal Party of Australia, „Mr. K.S. Beazley, the Liberals and the voters would like to know...‟ The 
Queensland Liberal, September 1966. 
 8 
 
The third way in which the American Alliance affected the 1966 Election was during the 
official campaign period. Due to its proximity to the election the LBJ visit is considered to be 
part of the campaign period in this thesis. Chapter four will be examining how the visit itself 
is a clear example of the American Alliance impacting upon the 1966 election, but further to 
this the chapter will be exploring how several political Party‟s (including the LCP) used the 
American Alliance in their election materials. The LBJ visit gave a considerable lift to the 
already popular policies of the LCP, and was a clear representation of the goodwill between 
the two nations during 1966. The potential effect of the visit had been debated since it was 
announced by Holt, with politicians such as Fred Daly commenting that:  
 
„The visit was perfectly timed – almost on the eve of the elections. It was the first time 
in Australia that such a personality has been used so unscrupulously – and allowed 
himself to be – for political purposes. Holt was as good as elected the day LBJ 
departed.‟7 
 
The ALP‟s „other‟ opposition, the Democratic Labor Party (DLP) provides a very clear 
example of how the ALP‟s attitude to the Vietnam War and the American Alliance was 
utilized in election material, with one pamphlet informing voters that: 
 
„The ALP attacks our friends, the Americans, and defends our enemies.‟8   
 
                                                 
7
 Daly, Fred. From Curtin to Kerr (Melbourne: Sun Books Pty Ltd, 1977), p.179. 
8
 The Democratic Labor Party. Think Carefully, election pamphlet (Potts Point: Braddon Printing Pty Ltd, 
1966).   
 9 
Statements such as this were exceedingly common during the 1966 election, and they 
demonstrate how the American Alliance was able to influence the election. 
 
The Australian Federal Election of 1966 is unique in Australian history as it was fought 
almost exclusively on matters of foreign policy. And yet all pieces of scholarship on the 
election have focused solely on the matters of conscription for Vietnam, or the LBJ visit 
rather than examining how both of these were symptoms of the American Alliance impacting 
upon Australian policy decisions. This thesis will seek to close this gap in scholarship, and 
prove that the American Alliance played a significant role on the LCP landslide victory on 
the twenty-sixth of November 1966. 
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II 
A BACKGROUND TO ANZUS AND THE ELECTION 
 
The American Alliance is better known by its full name, the Australian, New Zealand, United 
States Security Treaty (ANZUS). Signed in 1951, the treaty was the result of years of 
petitioning for a Pacific Pact by Australia, and whilst it was initially given very little public 
attention it would be heralded as the main pillar of Australian foreign and defensive policy 
from the late 1950s onwards.
9
 At its signing ANZUS was considered to be instrumental in 
developing Australian ties with the new democratic power of the post Second World War 
world, as well as a strong defence against the other power of the post war world, 
communism. However it took a considerable amount of time for the Australian – American 
relationship to be formalised into ANZUS despite several instances of defence cooperation 
between the two nations.  
 
The Australian – American relationship significantly predates the signing of ANZUS, indeed 
there have been times when the relationship between the two nations was so strong that it is 
surprising that a treaty was not signed sooner. As early as 1907 the Australian Government 
showed interest in some form of a relationship with America, with the then Prime Minister 
Alfred Deakin encouraging his American counterpart Theodore Roosevelt to include 
Australia in the tour of the Great White Fleet (the battle fleet of the United States Navy). 
Roosevelt agreed that Australia being included in the Fleet‟s itinerary would be worthwhile 
and during late August and early September of 1908 the Fleet docked in Sydney, Melbourne, 
and Albany.
10
 This visit by the American fleet was a resounding success and a signal to many 
Australians that despite their increasing sense of cultural isolation in their predominantly 
                                                 
9
 Lowe, David. Menzies and the ‘Great World Struggle’ Australia’s Cold War 1948-1954 (Sydney: University 
of New South Wales Press Ltd, 1999), p.77. 
10
 Churchward, Lloyd Gordon. Australia & America 1788-1972: An Alternative History (Sydney: Alternative 
Publishing Cooperative Ltd, 1979), p.126. 
 11 
Asian region there was a strong fellow minded power other than Britain able to flex its 
military muscle (Britain had coincidently recently signed a treaty with Japan, a move many 
Australians found disturbing).
11
 Several works of music and poetry were written during the 
visit which expressed the views of many ordinary Australians, one such song, entitled Big 
Brother, commented on the „sameness‟ of the two nations cultural backgrounds and 
effectively called the two nations to stand together in a demonstration of race patriotism.
12
 
However no alliance ever came out of the Great White Fleet‟s visit, historians such as Neville 
Meaney have correctly argued that this was because the Fleet tour was the result of the 
Australian Government seeking to force Britain into a more pro-active role in Pacific defence 
rather than seeking some form of alliance with America.
13
 
 
The concept of an Australian-American relationship would again become a prominent issue 
during the Second World War when Prime Minister John Curtin, faced with Japanese entry 
into the conflict, and with the majority of the Australian defence force posted in Europe, 
announced on the eve of 1942 that „Australia looks to America, without any pangs as to our 
traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom‟.14 At the time the statement caused 
considerable controversy, despite the likelihood of Japanese invasion and Britain indicating it 
would be unable to aid in Australian defence. The LCP feeling that the ALP was disloyal to 
Britain was only confirmed by the statement. The controversy Curtin caused was however 
quickly forgotten when the War in the Pacific became particularly heavy and American 
involvement was the only saving grace for Australians facing national defence without the 
aid of Britain. The placing of Australian troops under the direction of American General 
MacArthur certainly demonstrated the importance the Australian government placed on 
                                                 
11
 Meaney, Neville, The Search for Security in the Pacific 1901-1914 : A History of Australian Defence and 
Foreign Policy 1901-1923 (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 2009), p.168. 
12
 Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific 1901-1914, p.169. 
13
 Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific 1901-1914, p.172. 
14
 Curtin, John. 27 December 1941, The Task Ahead, Herald (Melbourne). 
 12 
American defence capabilities.
15
 However the relationship between Australia and America 
was still not formalised despite the close defence arrangements of the War.  
 
The desire for a solidified Australian-American relationship would not be realised until the 
Menzies government came to office in 1949 and the LCP‟s Minister for External Affairs, 
Percy Spender began to actively seek a formalised alliance. Much to their chagrin, Britain 
was excluded, as were several other nations within the Pacific who felt that a Pacific Pact 
should include considerably more Pacific members. Spender‟s conviction that the United 
Nations would be unable to guarantee world security strengthened his belief that America 
must become Australia‟s greatest and most powerful friend.16 According to several historians, 
including David Lowe, Menzies, in the face of the Cold War, was preparing for the outbreak 
of another hot war and so gave Spender considerable support. The conflict in Korea only 
encouraged Menzies suspicions, and in his drive for alliance building it took very little to 
convince Australia to become involved in the Korean War.
17
 In addition to desiring a 
powerful ally Peter Edwards gives us valuable insight into the secondary reason Australia 
desired ANZUS. During both of the World Wars Australia had largely been ignored, or 
simply uninvited to major strategic conferences.
18
 This snub had left several Australian Prime 
and External Affairs Ministers with damaged egos and confusion as to what exactly 
Australian sacrifices had brought at the world table. ANZUS was for Spender an attempt to 
gain Australia global influence. In addition to Australia desiring a new powerful ally, 
America was desperate for an arrangement through which Japan would be given a „soft 
peace‟. Despite having decimated Japan at the conclusion of the Second World War America 
was keen to rebuild Japan into a democratic nation modelled on America, and to place 
                                                 
15
 Fitzsimons, Peter. Kokoda (Sydney: Hachette Australia, 2004), p.106. 
16
 Forbes, Cameron. The Korean War, Australia in the Giants’ Playground (Sydney: Pan Macmillan Australia, 
p.22). 
17
 Forbes, The Korean War, p.22. 
18
 Edwards, Peter. Permanent Friends? (Double Bay: Longueville Media, 2005), p.16. 
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military instillations closer to communist forces.
19
 Australia was against the American plans 
for Japan, fearing possible Japanese rearmament. However in return for Australian 
involvement in Korea, and agreement for a „soft peace‟ with Japan America granted Australia 
the ANZUS treaty. 
   
Neither Australia nor America truly got what they desired out of the treaty, Australia was not 
guaranteed any firm protection or influence and the Alliance was just another for America in 
the Cold War. Historian Paul Ham goes as far as to call the treaty (particularly for Australia) 
a „very frayed safety net‟ with the wording of the treaty so vague that neither nation would 
actually be required to aid another in a full military capacity.
20
 And yet as previously stated it 
became the „pillar‟ of Australian security. At no time was this more evident than during the 
1966 federal election when the issue of Vietnam and Australia‟s commitments to America 
under the Alliance became particularly prominent. What follows is an exploration of the 
major texts which will be used to support the argument that the American Alliance affected 
the outcome of the 1966 election on several levels.   
 
The conscription debate was a central issue of the 1966 election, with the LCP advocating its 
scheme of national service as the only option for a rapid build-up of Australia‟s defence 
capabilities. The ALP argued that rather than allowing for an increase in national defence, 
conscription allowed the Australian government to call up those who were opposed to (and 
had previously been exempt from fighting in a) war. Edwards‟ study of Australian post 
World War Two involvement in South-East Asian conflicts provides an important 
background to understanding the controversy surrounding conscription. Of particular interest 
                                                 
19
 Guthrie-Shimizu, Sayuri. „Japan, the United States, and the Cold War, 1945–1960‟, Eds. Melvyn P. Leffler 
and Odd Arne Westad. The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume 1: Origins, (Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), p.247-248. 
20
 Ham, Vietnam, The Australian War, p.90. 
 14 
to this thesis as a whole is his work Crisis and Commitments as within this text Edwards 
provides a thorough examination of incidents which created the situation in 1966 in which 
America was able to exert influence on Australian politics. In particular Edwards examines 
the Malayan Emergency, the introduction of national service, and the beginnings of the 
conflict in Vietnam. This background information is important as the issues of the 1966 
election were not completely new developments. Edwards‟s most important point in Crisis 
and Commitments is his linking of the initial Australian decision to commit to Vietnam with 
the Australian desire to keep the then new American Alliance strong.
21
 This concept is of 
vital importance to this thesis as it demonstrates why the need for loyalty to America was 
framed around the Vietnam War during the 1966 election. 
 
Of equal importance to Edwards‟ examination of the conscription debate is the work of 
Malcolm Brown‟s text You’re Leaving Tomorrow, which examines the rationale driving the 
introduction of conscription and the battle between both the political parties and everyday 
Australians. Browns arguments are in line with those found in Edward‟s second text A Nation 
at War, with both historians concluding that conscription was borne out of the Malayan 
emergency. This was because emergency prompted the Australian Government to realise that 
Great Britain was going to expect Australia to be responsible for Commonwealth nations 
within its region.
22
 Brown furthers this point by suggesting that during the Emergency it 
became very clear to all those „in the know‟ that there were never going to be enough regular 
members of the Australian army to meet the manpower demands in the increasingly unstable 
Indochina region and the issue of conscription would need to be addressed.
23
 This however is 
                                                 
21
 Edwards, Peter and Gregory Pemberton. Crises and Commitments: The Politics and Diplomacy of Australia’s 
Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948-1965 (North Sydney: Allen & Unwin Pty Ltd, 1992), p.357-358. 
22
 Brown, Malcolm. „Caught up in the Mess.‟ You're Leaving Tomorrow (North Sydney: Random House 
Australia, 2007), p.1-76; p.6-8; Edwards, Peter. A Nation at War: Australian Politics, Society and Diplomacy 
during the Vietnam War 1965-1975 (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin Pty Ltd, 1997), p.76. 
23
 Brown, „Caught up in the Mess‟, p.12. 
 15 
where Brown stops; he fails to examine the effect this realisation had on both the conscription 
debate during the 1966 election, and the decision to attempt to strengthen the relationship 
with America. Rather he simply asserts that these realisations (that Britain was leaving the 
region and that the Australian military was inadequate) were why the Australian public was 
initially so willing to accept both conscription and Australia‟s early involvement in the 
Vietnam War.   
 
The arguments contained within Garry Woodard‟s work Asian Alternatives on conscription 
are in line with those of Brown and Ham (discussed below), in that Australian conscription 
debate had just as much to do with the LCP need for a „bargaining chip‟ with America to 
provide Australia with security as it did with anything else.
24
 In contrast Gregory Pemberton 
argues that conscription in Australia was not the result of Australia attempting to gain favour, 
but rather a response to considerable pressure placed upon the Menzies/Holt government by 
their American counterparts.
25Woodard‟s argument also explores the important early 
developments of Australian American ties following the start of British removal from the 
Asia-Pacific region.
26
 However Woodard fails to explore how Australian concern over 
security attributed to the near universal (within Australia) support for conscription in its early 
years, which is odd as the conscription debate in 1966 was very clearly linked to Australian 
fears over protection. This in turn was linked to a desire to keep the American Alliance strong 
by providing America with adequate troop numbers in Vietnam. Henry Albinski does 
however examine how public fear in Australia lead to a high level of support for conscription, 
his paper on the Australian Political Process provides considerable analysis on the Morgan 
                                                 
24
 Woodard, Garry. Asian Alternatives: Australia's Vietnam Decision and Lessons on Going to War. (Carlton: 
Melbourne UP, 2006), p.322. 
25
 Pemberton, All the Way, p.306-309; p.321-322. 
26
 Woodard, Asian Alternatives, p.66. 
 16 
Gallup polls relating to the issues of Australian men being conscripted, Australians fighting 
in Vietnam, and Australian conscripts fighting in Vietnam.
27
  
 
In addition to an examination of the polls, Albinski also examines the platform the ALP, and 
more particularly Calwell, took on the issue of conscription.  Albinski‟s main argument states 
that the particularly hard line Calwell took on conscription, being that it should be ended 
immediately and all troops returned to Australia (regardless of the impact it had upon 
America), alienated several electorates and members of his own party.
28
 This is an important 
argument to examine under the as Calwell was clearly aware that an end to Australian 
national service would frustrate America as it would demonstrate to the world that even 
minor western powers were disinterested in the conflict. However whilst Albinski is correct 
in introducing this line of argument he fails to develop it further, preferring to examine how 
the possibility of damaging the American Alliance frustrated voters as opposed to exploring 
how the LCP used Calwell‟s willingness to anger America as a „selling point‟ for 
conscription. This thesis will seek to close this gap in Albinski‟s argument. The work of 
individuals such as Trevor Reese, Jeffery Grey, Peter Pierce and L.G Churchward will be 
used to round out the examination of the conscription debate and how the American Alliance 
influenced said debate. Churchward in particular will analysed due to his examination of the 
use of ANZUS to justify the decision to commit to Vietnam and raise a military through 
conscription.
29
  
 
As previously stated the conscription debate was not the only feature of the 1966 election 
influenced by the American Alliance, as the public fracturing of the ALP gave considerable 
                                                 
27
 Albinski, Henry S. „Vietnamese Protest & the Australian Political Process‟, Polity, 1.3 (1969): 359-375, p. 
362-367. 
28
 Albinski, „Vietnamese Protest and the Australian Political Process‟, p.367. 
29
 Churchward, Lloyd Gordon. Australia & America 1788-1972: An Alternative History (Sydney: Alternative 
Publishing Cooperative Ltd, 1979), ch.8. 
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credence to the LCP claim that the ALP would be incapable to maintaining alliance 
strength.
30
  This fracturing is important as a big part of the ALP infighting was focused on 
how the Party could continue to advocate for a cessation of hostilities in Indochina whilst 
remaining loyal to the American Alliance.  
 
The works of historians Brian McKinlay and Louise Overacker will be heavily analysed in 
this thesis. McKinlay focuses on the history the Labor Party, and clearly his work on the 
Calwell years will be of interest. Despite the strong anti-LCP bias in his work, McKinlay 
does provide some interesting arguments for the collapse of ALP unity during the election 
year. In particular McKinlay argues that the increasingly emotional stance Calwell decided to 
take on conscription at the cost of all other potential election issues (such as those relating to 
domestic policies) alienated many within his own party. This gave the ALP, according to 
McKinlay, the appearance of being a single issue party in the final weeks before the nation 
went to the polls.
31
 This concept is one of considerable relevance to this thesis due to its 
examination of conscription and Vietnam; however McKinlay fails to explore the issue 
further. Brown also presents an argument which concludes that the issue of conscription and 
loyalty towards America put the Labor Party in an awkward position, in which Calwell had to 
present a pro-America image despite activities by others within his Party.
32
 Overacker 
presents a similar argument to McKinlay, but does goes further by correctly suggesting that 
along with the disunity over conscription the ALP‟s inability to cohesively present an 
alternative to the American Alliance for Australian security resulted in more confusion for 
                                                 
30
 The Liberal Party of Australia, Which Way to Freedom, election pamphlet, (Leichhardt: Holland & Newton, 
1966). 
31
McKinlay, Brian. The ALP: A Short History of the Australian Labor Party (Richmond: 
Drummond/Heinemann, 1981), p.129. 
32
 Brown, „Caught up in the Mess‟, p.14. 
 18 
Australian voters as to where exactly Labor stood on the issues of Vietnam, national service, 
and loyalty to the American Alliance.
33
 
 
A particular focus of the fourth chapter will be the infighting between Calwell and Whitlam; 
and consequently Graham Freudenberg‟s work A Certain Grandeur, which focuses on Gough 
Whitlam‟s time in the ALP, will be examined. Freudenberg not only analyses ALP events  in 
which Whitlam was involved, but explores the origins of Whitlam‟s point of view on the 
decision to go to Vietnam and the twin issue of using conscripts there. Most importantly 
Freudenberg looks at the problem created by the ALP not developing a „timetable‟ for troop 
withdrawal from Vietnam. The problem created by this was that the conflicting statements 
made by ALP members could not be denied by others within the party as no one knew what 
was going on.
34
 Brian Carroll agrees with this argument, commenting that the differing 
statements issued by Calwell and Whitlam led to an environment in which not only the Party, 
but the Australian public were confused over the ALP‟s intentions.35 In addition to this 
Freudenberg correctly argues that the ALP knew from the outset that they were at a major 
disadvantage in 1966 as Vietnam was a popular war, and they knew that any presentation of 
an anti-Vietnam campaign could be linked to anti-Americanism.
36
 Whitlam went out of his 
way to demonstrate that members of the American government were just as opposed to 
Vietnam as the ALP was, and therefore (according to Freudenberg) the ALP would not 
damaging the American alliance if it debated against continued involvement.
37
 These 
attempts by Whitlam were however rendered void by the activities of other ALP members 
which will be discussed in chapter four.  
                                                 
33
 Overacker, Louise. Australian Parties in a Changing Society: 1945-67 (Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire Publishing 
Pty Ltd, 1968), p.312-313. 
34
 Freudenberg, Graham. A Certain Grandeur: Gough Whitlam in Politics (South Melbourne: MacMillan 
Publishing, 1977), p.52-54. 
35
 Carroll, Brian. Whitlam (Dural: Rosenberg Publishing Pty Ltd, 2011), p.56. 
36
 Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, p.52-54. 
37
 Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, p.58-59. 
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Clearly if this thesis is going to be examining the effect of the American Alliance on the 1966 
election then it is important that the events within the „official‟ campaign period be 
examined, consequently this will be the focus of the final chapter of this thesis. Of particular 
importance will be a study of the LBJ visit of October 1966, as this visit highlighted the 
apparent influence the American Alliance could have on an Australian election. Edwards‟ 
previously mentioned text A Nation at War is again useful in examining the campaign itself. 
Within this text are two chapters, both titled „The long election campaign‟ which focus on the 
1966 campaign for both the LCP and the ALP. Whilst there are few original arguments 
contained within these chapters they are useful for providing a good background framework 
to the campaign as they feature occurrences such as Holt‟s 1966 visit to America, where he 
gave his infamous „all the way with LBJ‟ speech. This is important as the speech would form 
part of the ALP‟s supposed evidence that the LCP was willing to give America a „blank 
cheque‟ for Vietnam.38 Understanding the effect of this speech on the campaign is important, 
as it very much established the election as being one were the American Alliance would 
receive top billing.  
 
Lastly, Paul Ham‟s text Vietnam, the Australian War is worth analysing when exploring the 
election campaign of 1966. In particular his discussion of the effect of the LBJ visit, which 
has divided scholars since 1966. Ham does not make an outright comment on how he thinks 
the visit altered the election but he does make it very clear that LBJ was welcomed as a hero 
when he arrived in the country.
39
 This is important to examine as the presidential visit (as 
previously mentioned) was very much a symptom of the developing Australian-American 
relationship. As with much of Edwards‟ work, the lack of any clear-cut argument within 
                                                 
38
 Edwards, A Nation at War, p.113. 
39
 Ham, Vietnam: the Australian War, ch.21. 
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Ham‟s text means that its best application is that of background knowledge to the campaign, 
however as he does focus on issues which occurred immediately prior to election day it is 
vital that this text be used in this thesis. Paul Williams‟ paper on the LBJ visit does however 
take a very clear stance on the effect of the LBJ visit. Williams supports the idea that whilst 
the visit was an outstanding exercise in putting a public face to the American Alliance it did 
not actually allow for the LCP victory. By examining the voter patterns in each electorate 
LBJ visited Williams believes he has proved conclusively that the visit did not swing non-
Liberal or Country Party voters away from other parties.
40
 Williams‟ argument is supported 
Albinski and Overacker, both of whom feel that it would be naive to assume that a visit by a 
foreign dignitary could affect an Australian election. The argument is however it is contested 
by others such as Ray Aitchison, who argues that the visit was full of pomp and ceremony, 
designed to impress the Australian public, and distract them from the issues of Vietnam and 
conscription.
41
 
 
Aside from examining the effect of the LBJ visit other activities within the official campaign 
period will be analysed (both throughout the thesis and in chapter four) such as the image of 
party leaders. This is important to note  as 1966 was, aside from being the first foreign policy 
election, one of the earliest elections where the appearance of the Party leader was important. 
Historians such as Ham are quick to suggest that one of the biggest problems faced by the 
ALP was the fact that Calwell came across as old and out of touch in comparison the Holt 
who appeared to be relevantly modern and suited to an election which was now run on 
television rather than print media.
42
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The Australian election of 1966 is unique in Australian history in that it focused almost solely 
on issues of foreign rather than domestic policy. In particular 1966 focused on the issues 
related to Australian involvement in the Vietnam War, conscription and loyalty to the 
American Alliance. This thesis will seek to argue that the American Alliance played a 
considerable role in the landslide re-election of the Holt lead LCP Government. 
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III 
THE CONSCRIPTION DEBATE 
 
In late 1964 a conspicuous brown envelope was delivered to the home of Barry Heard in the 
small remote Victorian town of Tongio. It informed him that his number had been drawn in 
the ballot for the first intake of conscripts and that he would be required to attend a medical to 
determine if he was fit for service. Conscription was not a subject that was often discussed 
among Barry‟s family and friends and the chances of being drafted seemed very remote for 
the nineteen-year-old farmhand. As the first person to be drafted in his district following the 
passing of the National Service Act 1964 Barry was isolated in his feelings of trepidation and 
unable to fully comprehend the implications of his call up notice.
43
 Although he failed his 
first medical examination Barry was successfully redrafted in February 1966 and was soon 
afterwards on his way to Puckapunyal – the Australian Army‟s Victorian recruit training 
centre.
44
 Barry‟s experience of conscription and frustration at being unable to refuse the draft 
was common among young Australian men, particularly after the changes to the National 
Service Act in 1965, which allowed them to be posted overseas. Once that brown envelope 
arrived a young man was conscripted into the Australian Army for two years unless he could 
provide strong evidence for deferment.
45
  
  
By the time Barry was re-drafted in 1966 the question of conscription under the National 
Service Act of 1965 had become a deeply contested issue in Australian Parliament. Despite 
the controversy surrounding the debate over conscription in 1966, this was by no means a 
new issue in either Australian politics or public consciousness.
46
 Conscription had been 
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passed into law twice in Australian history prior to 1964, but it was the 1965 National Service 
Act which created the most debate as it allowed men to be posted to any nation the Australian 
Government felt necessary. Whilst this act had been borne out of the Australian need to be 
self reliant in defence, by the 1966 election its reasoning had shifted away from self reliance 
and towards alliance building. The 1966 election was fought on foreign policy, particularly 
regarding the American Alliance. This alliance (by the time of the 1966 election) was 
publicly centred on only one issue - the Vietnam War. More importantly it was focused on 
the conscription of Australians to fight in Vietnam in the hope that the United States would 
remain engaged in South East Asia and repel Chinese communism.  
 
Conscription in Australia had been an issue since the 1910s; indeed, the conscription debate 
was very heated during the First World War, with Prime Minister Hughes attempting to pass 
legislation allowing for conscription via referendum twice. Both of these attempts failed, 
although the debate was re-ignited with the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, and 
concerns over a possible invasion of Australia saw the creation of a Citizens Militia Force. In 
October 1939 it was announced that the Australian government would be building a reserve 
force by drafting all unmarried 21-year-old males and they would receive three months of 
training. Those who had been drafted into this reserve force were subsequently known as 
National Service Personnel.
47
 Under this early incarnation of conscription, there was a strict 
condition that those who were drafted would only serve in Australia. Even under this model 
of conscription the concept of alliance loyalty appeared, with the External Affairs Minister 
William Hughes stating in parliament that a non-build up of Australia‟s defence force in the 
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face of such a war would be akin to the nation „turning its back on Great Britain.‟48 In 1942, 
after an amendment to allow members of the Citizens Militia Force to serve in Australian 
territories in addition to the mainland, national service personnel were called up for active 
duty in defence of Australia. This had been deemed necessary as all volunteer military units 
were posted overseas and National Service Personnel were deployed to repel the Japanese in 
Papua New Guinea. This call up for military service raised the contentious question of 
Australia‟s loyalty to Britain who had been unable to answer Australian requests for military 
assistance in the Pacific during the Second World War (due to the extensive British 
commitment in Europe). By contrast, America‟s vested interest in defeating the Japanese in 
the Pacific meant that they were willing to offer Australia military assistance to defend 
Australian territories. Following the Japanese invasion of Papua New Guinea it was deemed 
necessary for Australian conscripts to be deployed to any nation in the Pacific, thereby 
avoiding future military threats to Australia.
49
 The 1943 amendments to the Defence Act 
allowed for the Citizens Militia Force to serve in the South West Pacific region, thereby 
ending concerns that Australia would be unable to defend positions vacated by the American 
military.
50
 Although the compulsory military training scheme of the Second World War was 
ended with the conclusion of the conflict in 1945, it provided the framework upon which the 
1965 National Service Act was based.
51
 The rhetoric used during the Second World War that 
linked conscription to alliance loyalty in the face of conflict was also recycled in 1966 by the 
LCP who had similarly advocated for the introduction of conscription in 1939.  
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In reaction to the Korean War, conscription was again reintroduced in 1951, although this too 
was abandoned in 1959.
52
  The National Service Act of 1951 required all 18-year-olds to 
register for the call-up. Those who were drafted received training in one of the branches of 
the defence force for a period of five to six months. This scheme was criticised as being both 
irrelevant to Australia‟s defence needs and a drain on national finances because focus had 
moved away from producing large numbers of adequately trained troops to producing smaller 
groups of highly trained personnel.
53
 By 1959 these criticisms had become loud enough for 
the scheme to be abandoned, and all National Service Personnel recruited during this period 
were honourably discharged. No National Service Personnel conscripted during this period 
were required to serve in foreign conflicts such as The Malayan Emergency.
 54
   
 
The Malayan Emergency inflamed Australian concerns over the growing threat of 
communism and its potential infiltration of Australian society in the 1950s. Fought between 
the Commonwealth Armed Forces and the Malayan Communist Party, the Emergency was 
the last conflict to which Commonwealth Armed Forces were deployed.
55
 Borne out of World 
War Two, the Emergency was linked to British colonial laws aimed at preserving the 
dominance of ethnic Malay‟s over ethnic Chinese.56 These laws meant that many ethnic 
Chinese felt more kinship with China than Malaya; with nationalism rife in post-war Asia, 
combined with the pressures of the post-war rebuilding, the appeal of Chinese communism 
was strong. In 1948 the hold of communism lead to a communist uprising in Malaya, and the 
proximity of this uprising to Australia caused considerable concern to the Australian 
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Government. By 1950 Australia had committed forces to ensure that the „communist threat‟ 
in the region was removed. The strength of the Commonwealth armed forces force meant that 
the Malayan National Liberation Army was rendered ineffective by 1955 but the Emergency 
was not declared over until 1960.
57
 Whilst it was a clear victory against both communist 
aggression and aggression in general, for the Australian government it became very clear that 
Britain was not the great and powerful protector it had once been and in its withdrawal from 
the Asia Pacific region, Britain was expecting Australia to take a much larger role in the 
defence of the region.
58
  
 
The Indonesian declaration of independence in 1945 and the resulting territorial dispute over 
West New Guinea during the late 1950s and early 1960s aggravated Australian fears over the 
spread of communism in the Asia-Pacific region. The lack of British or American support for 
Australian claims to West New Guinea as a „buffer zone‟ against communism forced 
Australia to realise that it did not possess the military capabilities necessary to intervene 
independently in Pacific conflicts. Furthermore it forced the reconsideration of national 
defence plans which had previously been drawn up under the assumption that either Britain 
or America would provide military assistance.
59
  
 
Apart from Australian concerns over the Pacific region, the 1960s also saw increased 
instability in Vietnam. Continued dissatisfaction over the „splitting‟ of Vietnam into the 
communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North) and the „democratic‟ Republic of 
Vietnam (South) had resulted in a guerrilla war between the Viet Cong and the government 
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of South Vietnam.
60
 By the early 1960s attacks against South Vietnam had increased 
dramatically: in 1964 alone 429 village officials had been assassinated and a further 1,482 
kidnapped.
61
  In August 1964 Australian concerns over the situation in Vietnam were greatly 
intensified with the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, during which the Naval forces of America and 
North Vietnam briefly collided and the Tonkin Gulf Resolution was passed in America.
62
 
This resolution was effectively an American declaration of war on North Vietnam and the 
Menzies Government again concluded that should instability in the region escalate, the 
numbers of active military personnel were inadequate to defend Australia and those nations 
whose security was vital to Australian interests.  
 
By 1964 the criticisms of the National Service Scheme of the 1950s were forgotten, and the 
strength of Australia‟s Army was openly mocked by the Australian media and public.63 In 
response Menzies and his government would present the National Service Act of 1964, 
effectively an amendment and re-introduction of the 1951 Act. This Act stipulated that all 20-
year-old males must register for service. Only a certain number of those registered would be 
called up; those selected would then be required to undergo twenty-four months of 
continuous service but these individuals would not be required to serve outside of Australian 
territory.
64
 The aim of this national service scheme was to increase the strength of the 
Australian Army from 22,750 men to approximately 33,000 by 1966 and this, reasoned the 
Menzies Government, would be an adequate amount of troops for Australia to repel any 
potential threat from Indonesia.
65
 This re-introduction became a topic of conversation not 
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only within Australia but also in America, where newspaper articles were quick to point out 
that this „peacetime‟ conscription was a reaction to growing concerns over the likelihood of 
war with Indonesia. The issues of Vietnam and the rest of Indochina clearly played a very 
minor role even in the eyes of the American press, as evidenced by their reiteration of 
Menzies‟ stance that Australian fears were centred on the increasingly aggressive Indonesia.66 
The National Service Act of 1965 was a revision of the 1964 Act. The most important change 
contained within this revised Act was the decision that National Service personnel could 
serve outside of Australian territory.
67
 This decision to extend where conscripts could serve 
was linked with the increasing fears over communism gaining strength in Indonesia and 
previous confrontation there, as well as the Tonkin Gulf Incident, growing insurgency in 
Vietnam, and general unrest in the Asia-Pacific region. Indeed the announcement that 
Australia would be sending a battalion of troops to serve in Vietnam came only a week before 
the 1965 change to the National Service Act.
68
  
 
There have been various arguments as to why the Australian Government decided to commit 
to Vietnam. The two most prominent arguments are firstly, that there was a clear Australian 
desire to keep America invested in the South East Asian region and secondly, that Australia 
was desperate to ensure communism would not become a threat within its own nation by any 
means necessary. Reese is a supporter of the first argument, and argues that Australian troop 
deployments (and increases) were clearly linked to American requests for help. In answering 
these calls Reece concludes that Australia‟s primary aim for entering Vietnam was to ensure 
America was able to remain in the region.
69
 However historians such as Churchward (who 
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does admit that the ANZUS alliance put Australia in an awkward position over Vietnam) are 
more inclined to support the second argument, stressing that the appearance of anti-
communist ideology within Australia was centred around the belief of the Menzies 
government that Australia was preparing for a third World War.
70
 According to Churchward, 
it was this ideology, manifesting itself in such ways as the attempted introduction of anti-
communist legislation, which contributed to the Australian desire to confront the communist 
insurgency in South Vietnam. However by 1966 Australian involvement in Vietnam had 
clearly become a mix of both arguments, and the Australian public who had been 
„consuming‟ the anti-communist propaganda of the Menzies government since the early 
1950s, as well as the pro-ANZUS propaganda tied to Vietnam, largely accepted conflict in 
Indochina – and the National Service scheme with it.71   
 
By 1966 National Service was clearly linked to Vietnam alone.
72
 The Malayan Emergency 
had been concluded and concerns over Indonesian aggression had become a considerably 
more minor issue following the Gulf of Tonkin resolution.
73
 More importantly, the reasons 
for conscription had shifted away from the original purpose of facilitating Australian military 
independence. It had become a way for Menzies, and later Holt, to meet Vietnam troop 
commitments agreed upon with America. Using conscription to meet American demands 
allowed the ALP to accuse the LCP of becoming subservient to a foreign power. On the other 
hand, the LCP argued that conscription, rather than demonstrating subservience, actually 
ensured the continuation of a strong American Alliance. Whilst the ALP agreed that a strong 
American Alliance was in Australia‟s interest, it argued against the possibility of losing 
thousands of young men in a foreign conflict in order to keep it strong. 
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Calwell can be attributed with pushing the issue of conscription to the top of the agenda 
during the 1966 election. He had previously battled against conscription in 1916, publicly 
advocating for the „no‟ vote in the Hughes referendums. As a Member of Parliament during 
the Second World War he was just as vocal over the issue of conscription. While his own 
Party was in Government, Calwell stated in Parliament that:  
 
„As a youth, I was an anti-conscriptionist in the 1916 and 1917 campaigns, and I am as 
much an anti-conscriptionist in 1942. I see no fundamental difference, and I moved a 
resolution at the meeting of the Victorian Central Executive of the Australian Labour 
party expressing the view that there was no fundamental difference between the 
proposals enunciated by the Prime Minister [Mr. Curtin] in 1942 and those enunciated 
by the right honourable member for North Sydney [Mr. Hughes] in 1916. To me it does 
not matter where a man goes after he leaves Australian territory on compulsory service. 
To me geography does not matter. Whether the compulsion is for the Southwest Pacific 
or for Europe, it is still military conscription for overseas service, and, therefore, 
abhorrent to the traditional democratic principles of this country, and something that 
should be abhorred and shunned.‟74  
 
His emotional appeal against conscription during the Second World War carried through to 
the 1960s. Calwell‟s pushing of the conscription matter during the 1966 election meant that 
matters of domestic policy that could have been the issues of 1966 (such as Government 
funding for private schools under the LCP‟s school science block program, water 
conservation and programs focused on rural development) were rendered of secondary 
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importance to the debate about conscription. Indeed, Calwell‟s strong personal stance against 
conscription had begun to reach such heights by the time of the election that several members 
of his own party (including his deputy Whitlam) begun to fear that his increasingly emotional 
appeal, while comforting to those who shared his view, was alienating many voters.
75
 This 
said, the ALP was clearly running on the anti-conscription ticket as evidenced by election 
material such as the poster seen in fig 1. This poster clearly implored Australian parents to 
consider how they would feel if their own son was called up.
 
The LCP on the other hand 
employed images of alliance loyalty and keeping communism out of Australia, as seen in the 
poster of fig 2. The LCP appealed to the concept that while conscription was not ideal, it was 
a lesser evil than the possibility of losing the strength they gained through ANZUS.  
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Fig 2. 
The Liberal Party of Australia. It’s Your Choice. Election 
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Interestingly enough Calwell and the ALP never sought to capitalise on the fact that America 
had not supported Australia over the West New Guinea issue, but simply perused the anti-
conscription vote on the basis that forcing the conscripts to serve overseas was immoral.
76
 It 
is likely that the ALP chose not to engage in the issue outlined above, but rather chose to 
focus on the 1964 introduction of conscription as linked to the fact that America did not come 
and Australia had to develop its own defence force.   
 
For the ALP, the conscription debate came down to two main matters, primarily that it was 
morally wrong to force men to serve overseas. But the ALP also felt the conflict in Vietnam 
was a civil war rather than a symptom of the Cold War and therefore it was not in Australia‟s 
interests to join the conflict.
77
 In May of 1965 Calwell had established the second part of this 
argument, well before the 1966 election was called. Following the LCP announcement that 
Australian troops would be sent to Vietnam Calwell gave what can only be called the most 
passionate speech of his political life in opposition to the commitment: 
 
„we [the ALP] oppose this decision firmly and completely. We do not think it is a wise 
decision. We do not think it is a timely decision. We do not think it is a right decision. 
We do not think it will help the fight against Communism. On the contrary, we believe 
it will harm that fight in the long term. We do not believe it will promote the welfare of 
the people of Vietnam. On the contrary, we believe it will prolong and deepen the 
suffering of that unhappy people so that Australia's very name may become a term of 
reproach among them. We do not believe that it represents a wise or even intelligent 
response to the challenge of Chinese power. On the contrary, we believe it mistakes 
entirely the nature of that power, and that it materially assists China in her subversive 
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aims. Indeed, we cannot conceive a decision by this Government more likely to 
promote the long term interests of China in Asia and the Pacific. We of the Labour 
Party do not believe that this decision serves, or is consistent with, the immediate 
strategic interests of Australia. On the contrary, we believe that, by sending one quarter 
of our pitifully small effective military strength to distant Vietnam, this Government 
dangerously denudes Australia and its immediate strategic environs of effective defence 
power. Thus, for all these and other reasons, we believe we have no choice but to 
oppose this decision in the name of Australia and of Australia's security.‟ 78 
 
Calwell‟s strong opposition to Australian involvement in Vietnam meant that his opposition 
to the use of national service personnel was more pronounced than it had been in previous 
conflicts.  
 
The ALP called upon the disadvantages of conscription in increasing military capability, 
citing issues such as the burden of service not being shared by all young men and the drain on 
the defence budget, a drain resulting from training a force only required to serve for two 
years.
79
 The former of these disadvantages stemmed from the „birthday ballot‟ which 
determined who would be called up for service. Rather than employing a universal service, 
the National Service Act of 1964 and 1965 made use of selective service, and in an effort to 
ensure there would be no bias in regards to who was called up, the selection was done by a 
twice yearly ballot. Under this ballot all twenty-year-old men were required to register for 
national service; however, this did not mean they would be drafted. Rather, dates were drawn 
on marbles, and the marbles placed into a lottery barrel. If a registered man‟s birth date was 
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drawn from the barrel he was conscripted.
80
 In the eyes of the ALP this was grossly unfair as 
the „lottery of death‟ (as many ALP supporters called it) meant that you would only have to 
serve if you were unlucky enough to be born on a particular day of the month. The main 
election promise of the ALP was unsurprisingly that they would bring National Service 
personnel home from Vietnam at the earliest possible moment.  
 
Calwell expressed the ALP‟s views on conscription most effectively in his major policy 
announcement speech on 10 November 1966 in which he stated that: 
 
„The most important issue in this campaign is conscription, the conscription of a section 
of our twenty years old youths, against their wishes and their wills, to kill or be killed 
in the undeclared, civil war in Vietnam and the threatened extension of conscription to 
all twenty year olds and other age groups to increase our unwarranted and unnecessary 
commitment.‟81 
 
The LCP on the other hand stressed that whilst conscription was not the most desirable policy 
for the development of defence, it was the only viable option now that Australia was so 
involved in the defence of its region, for: 
 
„Withdrawal of national servicemen from Vietnam, as intended by the Labor Party, 
would render our task force ineffective and seriously disrupt the Army. It would 
inevitably mean loss of confidence in Australia by its allies.‟82 
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It is clear from this segment of Holt‟s 1966 election policy speech that for the LCP, 
conscription was tied not only to Vietnam but also to Australia‟s alliances. If Australia was to 
retain the United States as a valuable security ally then it had to be prepared to stand and fight 
with them. Just as it had in 1939, the issue appeared of Australia turning its back on an ally if 
it failed to maintain a suitably sized defence force.
83
 Loyalty was the main answer Holt and 
his Party provided in response to Calwell and his Party. If Australia were to withdraw 
conscripted troops from Vietnam then the whole strategy of Forward Defence would be 
pointless. The LCP made it very clear to voters that informing America that Australia could 
honour its obligations only if enough volunteers came forward would make it appear to be a 
very uncertain and un-worthwhile ally.
84
 The need to appear as a worthwhile ally struck the 
Australian public, as Calwell had willingly admitted that the ALP would bring conscripted 
troops home even if it did cause harm to the American Alliance and serving American 
personnel.
85
 This was problematic for the ALP, for loyalty to America (under the ANZUS 
treaty) had been presented to the Australian public as the solution to Australian security 
against communist threats in the region.
86
 The ALP was quick to point out that if it had to, 
Australia could and would stand on its own, and the use of National Service Personnel should 
only be a last resort if defence issues appeared within Australian territories.
87
 
 
Both the LCP and the ALP stood firm on the issue of conscription, but ultimately the call 
won out for providing adequate troop numbers to aid America and South Vietnam (who was 
supposedly fighting the insurgency alongside America and Australia) in order to ensure 
Australia‟s alliances remained strong. The Morgan Gallup polls of July 1966 demonstrated 
that 63% of Australians supported conscription, and yet only 36% agreed with sending them 
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to Vietnam. Despite this, 56% were in favour of continuing Australian involvement in the 
conflict.
88
 This demonstrates that whilst a large portion of the population was not in favour of 
sending conscripts to Vietnam, the idea of leaving America to remove the communist threat 
in Vietnam by itself was not appealing. In addition to these statistics, a poll commissioned by 
the Sydney Morning Herald in August 1966, demonstrated that 64% of respondents were in 
favour of Holt‟s support for American Vietnam policy.89 Whilst the opinions of Australian 
would shift dramatically as Australian commitment in Vietnam increased, the LCP was able 
to use the attitudes of Australians during 1966 in pro-alliance election material and rhetoric to 
ensure that conscription was accepted as a necessary evil in 1966.  
 
According to these results, Australians had clearly absorbed the pro-ANZUS message 
delivered by Holt. Furthermore, they accepted to a large extent the 1966 message that staying 
in Vietnam, which entailed keeping conscripts in the conflict, was good for the American 
Alliance. The ALP was therefore fighting an uphill battle from the start of the election 
campaign period in 1966. By situating the conscription debate against the backdrop of 
American Alliance, the LCP was able to present a message that the ALP would be content to 
„run out‟ on the American Alliance by withdrawing troops from Vietnam. This message of 
alliance abandonment won the LCP the conscription debate. The victory achieved here was 
further utilised by the LCP when fractures began to appear in the ALP‟s unity. The 
conscription debate would harm the ALP. Calwell‟s long-standing and firm opposition to 
national service was in stark contrast to the more „middle ground‟ approach his deputy 
Whitlam wished to take. Unfortunately the inability of the two men to present a cohesive 
message on the issue meant the Australian public was unwilling to put them into a position of 
power. 
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IV 
LABOR FALLS APART 
 
In 1967, the American Ambassador in Canberra, Edward Clark cabled LBJ with the 
following:  
 
„Calwell is suffering hardening of arteries which cuts down on blood flow to brain and 
thus affects full lucidity. Situation complicated by overindulgence in alcohol. Prognosis 
is for fairly rapid descent to senility.‟90  
 
Admittedly, Clark had never been fond of Calwell and took considerable glee in Calwell‟s 
1966 electoral defeat. Clark knew, as did Calwell that the ALP loss in 1966 was the end of 
Calwell‟s parliamentary career. Calwell had informed the ALP that should he fail to lead the 
Party to victory in 1966 he would not contest the leadership again.
91
 When he stepped down 
in 1967 there was no fanfare, and Calwell who had been a member of parliament for more 
than two decades, had served as the Minister for Immigration and had been the deputy leader 
of the ALP under Herbert Evatt before becoming Party leader himself in 1960 was quietly 
moved to the backbenches.
92
 Having already lost elections for the ALP in 1961 and 1963 
Calwell knew that 1966 was his last opportunity to become Prime Minister, but the uphill 
battle he faced in the conscription debate was only worsened by the disunity displayed by the 
ALP in the lead up to the election. Infighting, particularly between Calwell and his own 
deputy appeared before the election year, although greatly increased as the election loomed 
and members of the ALP became vocal over the issues of conscription and the American 
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Alliance. Disagreement over these issues was fatal for the Party, and demonstrated very 
clearly the effect of the American Alliance on the election outcome. 
 
Like most Federal Elections, the 1966 poll appeared on the surface to be a contest between 
the two party leaders, Holt and Calwell. But on the Labor side of politics the Party was far 
from united, and whilst and ALP victory would have been a party victory, an ALP loss was a 
Whitlam victory. The different tact Calwell and Whitlam decided to take in arguing that 
conflict in Vietnam was immoral whilst attempting not to alienate the pro-American 
Australian public resulted in significant party infighting. This concept was realised early by 
D.A. Boag, a campaigner for the Country Party held seat of Hume, who in a request for aid 
by the Liberal Party to retain the seat informed Holt that;  
 
„Hume has been singled out by the deputy leader of the Labor Party as his particular 
Campaign, with his Secretary as the Candidate. This promises to be a „no holds barred‟ 
campaign with Mr. Whitlam as the real candidate. He has abandoned Labor Party 
policy to use our policy as his own. It would be no exaggeration to say that he is 
campaigning for the A.L.P to lose the election but for him to win Hume, as part of his 
prestige campaign leading to eventual Prime Ministership.‟93 
 
Boag‟s comment was made in early September of 1966, but the clearly public break in the 
ALP occurred much earlier, and was over an issue completely unrelated to Vietnam or the 
American Alliance.  
 
Calwell and his deputy were divided before the campaign for the 1966 election began. 
Despite appearing to have worked as an ideal team during most of their partnership the 
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relationship began to publicly disintegrate in early February of 1966 when the two had traded 
blows over part of the ALP‟s domestic policy plans for education, and in the fallout from this 
argument Whitlam had narrowly avoided expulsion. Whilst not related to Vietnam or the 
American Alliance, this early disagreement between the two established an environment 
where it was clear to most Australian‟s that Calwell and Whitlam did not agree on vital ALP 
policy matters. The ALP‟s education policy of the period was formulated on the belief that 
the State should provide a system of compulsory secular education for all, and if individuals 
did not wish to use this system then they were entitled to develop a system of independent 
schools at their own cost.
94
 Effectively the policy was aimed at preventing non-government 
schools from receiving any government funding. In the 1963 election the Menzies 
government sought to capitalise on the dislike of the policy felt by several „traditional‟ ALP 
voters (particularly Roman Catholics, who had developed a strong system of non-government 
schools) by pledging a program of state-aid for non-government schools under the school 
science block program.
95
 Under this program Menzies pledged: 
 
„₤5M per annum for the provision of building and equipment facilities for science 
teaching in secondary schools. The amount will be distributed on a schools population 
basis, and will be available to all secondary schools, Government or independent, 
without discrimination.‟96  
 
This pledge was upheld, and as discussed in the previous chapter could have easily become a 
pivotal issue of the 1966 election. And whilst it did not become an issue in the actual 
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election, the LCP school science block program did become a major issue for the ALP in the 
lead up to the election.  
 
In an attempt to ensure that independent schools could not be given government funds, 
members of the ALP‟s Federal Executive voted to denounce all forms of State aid on the 
eighth of February 1966, well before they decided Vietnam would become the issue for the 
1966 election.
97
 Calwell supported the move, Whitlam did not. Whitlam wrote a letter (which 
was deliberately made public) to the ALP Secretariat, Cyril Wyndham, in which he 
lambasted the move and criticised the existing ALP education policy.
98
 Calwell responded by 
publicly supporting the decision of the Federal Executive.
99
 In return Whitlam went on 
national television and declared: 
 
„I can only say we have just got rid of the thirty-six faceless men stigma to be faced 
with the twelve witless men.‟100 
 
The Federal Executive, and Calwell, were understandably outraged and convened an 
emergency meeting in March, with the aim of expelling Whitlam from the Party, having 
charged him with „gross disloyalty‟.101 Historian Brian Carroll reports that Calwell was 
apparently „gleeful‟ at the prospect of expelling the „big bastard‟ Whitlam, which 
demonstrates that the animosity between the two men had reached a considerable peak prior 
to Vietnam becoming the issue of 1966.
102
  Whitlam was however not expelled from the 
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Party and following an apology in which he affirmed his loyalty to the ALP he informed the 
Executive that „the public will never elect a Labor Government until the party shows greater 
confidence in its parliamentarians‟ (that is to say that the ALP needed to stop informing its 
elected parliamentarians what they should be doing).
103
 Whitlam‟s escape from expulsion 
only served to increase the distrust between he and Calwell in the lead up to the election. 
 
In late April Whitlam, having only just avoided expulsion from the Party, challenged Calwell 
for the leadership position. Whitlam had publicly accused Calwell of being „too old and 
weak‟ to ever lead the ALP to victory in 1965 and clearly his attitude remained unchanged in 
the lead up to the election.
104
 At the urging of the New South Wales (NSW) Labor executive 
(who shared his views on Calwell‟s inability to lead the Party to victory) Whitlam attempted 
to take Calwell‟s job at the ALP Caucus meeting on the 27th April 1966.105 Frustration over 
Whitlam‟s early opinion that Australia should be involved in Vietnam in a United Nations 
capacity (discussed later in this chapter)  and Calwell‟s assertion that Australia should have 
no involvement at all, the NSW branch of the ALP put forth a motion that the current ALP 
leadership should resign and the positions be opened for re-election. Whitlam resigned 
immediately, Calwell did not. Consequently the matter was put to a vote, defeated 49 to 24 
and Whitlam was permitted to retake his position as deputy.
106
 This failed attempt to remove 
Calwell as leader was one of the early signs of the ALP fracturing in 1966, and one which 
Holt and the LCP would point to as evidence that even at the upper levels of the ALP there 
was no loyalty. Indeed the Liberal Parties director (J.R. Willoughby) sent a memo, dated May 
10 1966, to all federal Liberal parliamentarians informing them that whilst: 
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„It is certainly true that Mr. Whitlam, had he been promoted, might have been able to 
build up a more favourable image with the public than Mr. Calwell. But we feel that the 
decision to retain Mr. Calwell should not be accepted by us with any complacency.‟107  
 
This memo demonstrated that the level of infighting within the ALP had reached the stage 
where it was gaining considerable public attention. As the election date loomed and both 
Calwell and Whitlam became particularly vocal over the issues of conscription and the 
American Alliance the Party infighting only increased. Disagreement over these issues would 
prove fatal for the ALP, and demonstrated a clear effect of the American Alliance on the 
election outcome.  
 
Although Calwell and Whitlam had shared similar views on keeping troops in Vietnam to 
ensure America would not be abandoned in 1965, Calwell‟s opinion on the matter had shifted 
dramatically by the time of the election.
108
 Although he remained a staunch opponent of 
conscription Calwell had publicly stated in 1965 that „the United States must not withdraw 
and must not be humiliated in Asia‟ in response to a comment by Paul Hasluck (Australian 
External Affairs Minister under Menzies) that an anti-American campaign was being waged 
by the LCP‟s opponents.109 Calwell clearly saw huge value in the American Alliance and at 
the start of the American involvement in Vietnam both Calwell and the ALP caucus 
supported the deployment of Australian advisers.
110
 As the conflict intensified and Australia 
introduced National Service and pledged more troops the ALP still appeared to support the 
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conflict. However, this support was dependent upon the continued absence of conscripts from 
Vietnam. Calwell himself asserted that „sooner or later the dispute in Vietnam must be settled 
through the councils of the United Nations. If it is necessary to back with a peace force the 
authority of the United Nations, we would support Australian participation to the hilt.‟111 This 
statement from Calwell would of course allow for serious ambiguity over the ALP‟s 
intentions for Vietnam. It demonstrated to Australians that whilst they were against armed 
conflict in Vietnam under the direction of America, they were for armed conflict if the United 
Nations was.  
 
Whitlam‟s support for initial Australian commitment stemmed from his belief (which was 
shared by many in the Australian public) that America was the „only effective counterweight 
to Chinese [or communist] influence [in Indochina]‟.112 Historian Jenny Hocking provides us 
with the reasoning for this thinking. The ALP was genuinely concerned about the livelihood 
of the American Alliance. Completely denouncing American troops serving in Vietnam could 
embarrass America and harm the alliance.
113
 Gough Whitlam himself certainly agreed with 
this concept, having felt that the biggest problem for the ALP in 1966 was „how to oppose the 
American intervention without opposing America; how to denounce the war without 
denouncing the US.‟114 Brian Carroll suggests that Calwell‟s change in attitude was the final 
and unfixable divide between he and Whitlam, and their diverging attitudes concerning the 
war.
115
 Carroll‟s assertion is based on the switching of Calwell‟s stance on the Vietnam War 
issue; his 1965 declaration that America must not be humiliated was quickly reinvented as a 
denunciation of the Vietnam War as cruel and unwinnable.
116
 Whitlam however did not 
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change his stance and whilst he attempted to steer the election away from the Vietnam issue 
and towards domestic policy (as evidenced by his feelings on the ALP‟s independent school 
funding policy) it would only be a matter of time before he would be required to comment on 
his stance towards the Australian military commitment in Vietnam. 
 
When Whitlam did finally clarify his stance on Vietnam, Calwell was furious. Whitlam 
declared that in his opinion, a military victory in Vietnam was achievable. He supported 
Australia‟s involvement, and Australian support for America as a result of what he called a 
„fraternal feeling for our great allies‟.117 The LCP was once again quick to pick up on the 
friction caused by Whitlam‟s stance, and Holt went so far as to outline the issue to LBJ as it 
stood in August of 1966: 
 
„In the first two weeks of this parliamentary session the Opposition has shown itself to 
be hopelessly confused and divided on the issues of Vietnam and National Service. 
Opposition Leader, Calwell, keeps speaking of a „dirty, cruel, unwinnable war‟. But the 
deputy leader, Whitlam, who has recently returned from Vietnam, has asserted that a 
military victory may be secured within one or two years.‟118 
 
It is safe to assume from this correspondence that Whitlam‟s visit to Vietnam allowed him to 
solidify his view that the Australian involvement in the conflict remained worthwhile even if 
the ALP took office. This Vietnam visit, which occurred during the winter recess of 1966, 
was made by several high-ranking federal members of the ALP, although Calwell, who was 
initially also attending was forced to remain in Australia (due to his hospitalisation following 
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an assassination attempt). Certainly the visit of LBJ shifted the views of ALP Member of 
Parliament Jim Cairns who reported that following the visit he understood that immediate 
withdrawal of all foreign forces would be impractical and inhumane.
119
 Whitlam, as 
evidenced by the above extract clearly still saw value in supporting Australian (and 
consequently American) military involvement in South-East Asia, and this would allow for a 
very public „fracture‟ between he and Calwell in the final weeks before the election. Kim C. 
Beazley asserts that the issue for Whitlam was that he truly believed that Australia‟s interests 
lay in supporting an American military (and economic) role in the Indochina region.
120
 This 
is certainly a compelling argument, and it is clear to see from statements made to the media 
(such as his assertion following his Vietnam visit that Australia should stay in Vietnam) that 
whilst Whitlam was anti-conscription he did feel that an Australian commitment in Vietnam 
and a continuation of strong ties with America were essential to Australian security. 
Unfortunately Whitlam‟s opinions conflicted with those of Calwell who was resolved to 
withdraw all service personnel from Vietnam regardless of America‟s standpoint. 
 
The views of Cairns were another example of the disunity of the ALP over the issue of 
conscription, as like Calwell and Whitlam he had his own views on the matter. Cairns was a 
„ranking‟ member of the ALP federal parliamentarians, and effectively the leader of the far-
left wing of the Party. Consequently he agreed with Calwell‟s anti-conscription message and 
whilst he did support the Party line, Cairns made it very clear that he wanted all troops to 
come home from Vietnam.
121
 The main problem presented by this was that it clearly 
conflicted with the similar, but different views on troop involvement other ranking ALP 
members had given to the public. The Liberal Party picked up on this and produced a 
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pamphlet titled “Mr. Beazley (another ranking member of the ALP), the Liberals and the 
voters would like to know...‟, the body of this pamphlet outlined the problem presented by 
the three men‟s statements:   
 
„Bring home all national servicemen serving overseas. (Calwell).‟  
„Give the national servicemen the free opportunity of withdrawing. (Whitlam).‟  
„Bring home all troops from South Vietnam. (Cairns).‟122 
 
As evidenced by the above statements Cairns was providing nothing other than more 
confusion for the voters. If ranking members of the opposition could not come together on the 
single issue upon which they had deliberately centred the election, the public could fairly 
assume (and be encouraged by the LCP) that, should the ALP win the election, they would be 
incapable of governing cohesively.  
 
The disunity of the ALP was highly criticised by all other major parties as evidenced by the 
wording found on the reverse of one of the Liberal Party‟s campaign ads, „It‟s your choice‟ 
(fig. 3, see fig 2 for the front of this ad) highlighted the ALP infighting. In fact The Liberal 
Party actively encouraged he ALP‟s infighting as evidenced by the same memo from the 
tenth of May in which the Liberal Party director informed Liberal federal parliamentarians:
  
 „Our attack should be directed not to Mr. Calwell but to what we might now call the 
Calwell-Whitlam axis. It is demonstrable that Mr. Whitlam had consented to repudiate 
his so-called Right-Wing beliefs and identify himself with the Left-Wing policies 
sponsored by Mr Calwell. It should be our aim to show the electorate that the 
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Parliamentary Labor Party has elected to follow the Left-Wing masters of the ALP. 
This course would have two advantages. As well as building up our general attack on 
Left-Wing thinking it may be calculated to embarrass the Right-Wing and perhaps feed 
the underlying resentments between the factions.‟123 
 
These attacks clearly had the desired effect, as several ALP members (as previously outlined) 
made conflicting statements about the key issue of conscription.    
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ALP disunity over the issues of conscription and Australian involvement in Vietnam was rife, 
and not just between Calwell and Whitlam. In August of 1966 a Victorian Member of 
Parliament, Captain Sam Benson, was expelled from the ALP for publicly announcing that he 
supported the Australian commitment in Vietnam. Benson was a member of the Defend 
Australia Committee, a non-partisan group which supported the Australian commitment to 
Vietnam and the use of national service personnel in the conflict.
124
 Membership of such a 
group, which was usually associated more with the LCP and the Democratic Labor Party 
(DLP), was contrary to the official ALP line released in May of 1966 that as government, 
they would bring home all conscripts without delay.
125
 Benson refused to resign as a member 
of the Defend Australia Committee and as a result the ALP Federal Executive declared that 
any member of the Committee (or its Sydney based counterpart, the Defend Australia 
League) would be expelled from the Party, which Benson promptly was.
126
 Benson‟s eviction 
from the ALP was however not the end of his political career, he ran as an independent and 
retained his seat against an ALP endorsed candidate, demonstrating the ongoing popular 
appeal of both Australian involvement in the conflict in Vietnam and the use of conscripts.
127
  
 
The stance of the ALP on the American Alliance came to a head in October, when the LBJ 
visit was on Australia‟s doorstep. Faced with immense public support for the visit Calwell 
was forced into an awkward position. Edwards suggests that part of the reason for this 
awkwardness was not just the public support for LBJ but Calwell‟s American heritage 
(Calwell‟s grandfather was American and had immigrated to Australia in 1853).128 High 
public support combined with his heritage meant that Calwell had little choice but to publicly 
express support for American interests in Indochina and for LBJ‟s visit. In a speech 
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welcoming LBJ Calwell praised the American President‟s attempts to obtain some form of 
peace in Vietnam and called on the North Vietnamese to „come to the table‟ for peace talks, 
at the same time however he managed to avoided mentioning that he wanted to bring the 
troops home. This said he did manage to anger LBJ by openly alluding to the disagreement in 
the American Democratic Party over American involvement in Vietnam in his welcome 
speech.
129
  
 
Calwell‟s largely welcoming message was publicly contradicted by the ALP‟s federal 
president, Senator J.B. Keeffe, who openly stated that LBJ‟s visit was a „cheap political 
gimmick‟ and encouraged Australians to protest during LBJ‟s trip to demonstrate that „this 
country is not in favour of selling the lives and souls of young Australians in Vietnam.‟130 
Keeffe‟s comments were dismissed by Calwell and other ranking members of the ALP who 
were desperate to quell any anti-American and anti-Vietnam protests during the LBJ visit. 
Jeffery Grey has come to the conclusion that this was to prevent alienation with moderate 
middle class voters.
131
 Churchward however asserts that the desire of Calwell and the ALP to 
tone down statements by Keeffe was due to concerns that ALP sanctioned protests during the 
visit would provide „proof‟ that an ALP government would not honour the American 
Alliance.
132
 Certainly Churchward provides a compelling argument, that the awkward 
position Calwell was placed in during the visit was clearly fuelled by the need to not appear 
anti-American during such a popular visit. But the damage Keeffe had inflicted by publicly 
announcing that Australians should protest and treat the visit as a gimmick whilst Calwell 
said the opposite was significant. An opposition leader being unable to agree with his Party‟s 
leader over a central issue related to support of America gave the public the very disturbing 
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image that if elected Calwell would not have the ability to govern the Party he might form a 
government with. 
 
Calwell and Whitlam failed to agree on how withdrawal from of troops from Vietnam should 
occur. Whitlam‟s final statement of „clarification‟ on the issue only provided more confusion 
between he and Calwell. Whitlam stated that Australian troops would be brought home „as 
soon as possible‟ and further to this stated that:  
 
„after consultation with the American and Vietnamese governments, or after the 
reconvening of the Geneva conference, or after a resolution by the United Nations, the 
Labor Government judges that there should still be Australian troops in Vietnam it 
would send regular troops.‟133  
 
This „clarification‟ of 17 November was rejected by Calwell the following day when he 
stated that:  
 
„I [Calwell] didn‟t say that after consultation we would withdraw them. We will not be 
taking part in a dialogue with the Americans as to whether we should or should not 
withdraw. Withdrawal is our business and our right. We are not telling America to 
withdraw her troops, and she‟s certainly not telling us to withdraw our troops.‟ 134  
 
The LCP was able to jump on this particular fallout twice, once on the clear lack of Party 
loyalty and once on the apparent anti-Americanism in Calwell‟s statement.  
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The final spat between Whitlam and Calwell (which was the exact same argument the two 
men had just been involved in) came just days before the election, on November 22 The 
Australian ran a five word front page headline which effectively rang the death knell for the 
ALP. „Whitlam: Regulars Stay in Vietnam‟, the headline and story demonstrated all that was 
wrong with the ALP in the final few weeks before the 1966 election, the attempts at party 
unity had failed. Whitlam‟s statement was seized upon by the LCP as final proof of their 
inability to be loyal to each other, a claim which was strengthened only twenty four hours 
later when the major news outlets ran a story on Calwell‟s response, „Calwell contradicts 
Whitlam on troops‟ being one such story.135 This article (again in The Australian) went on to 
say that „In a statement presented as an outline of Labor policy, Mr Calwell plainly 
contradicted comments made by his deputy, Mr Whitlam, in Adelaide on Monday.‟136 
Calwell further confused the matter by announcing that an ALP government would raise a 
Citizens Military Force (CMF) of 140,000.
137
 This would serve as the Australian equivalent 
of the American National Guard (or today‟s Australian Army Reserve) and all members 
would be voluntary. Calwell‟s concept was based on the fact that many regular army 
volunteers were turned away due to medical or educational shortcomings, and by allowing 
these individuals to make up a reserve force Australia could do away with conscription.
138
 
This force would be used within Australian territory and could potentially be used in a UN 
force should the need arise. This CMF was a last minute attempt to show to the pro-
conscription public that even though the ALP was not for conscription was for strong 
Australian security. 
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This last minute adjustment in ALP defence policy came too late, and the infighting over 
conscription had done considerable damage. Three days before the election The Sydney 
Morning Herald ran the following headline:  
 
„On the eve of the election, the Opposition Leader, Mr A. A. Calwell, and his deputy, Mr E. 
G. Whitlam, have split in a manner unprecedented in the turbulent history of the Labor Party 
since 1949.‟139  
 
Calwell was forced to defend his party and stated the next day that „I give the lie direct to 
those who say there is a split within the Labor Party on Vietnam or anything else.‟140 
Calwell‟s timing in denying a split was poor, election material produced by the LCP (and in 
some cases the DLP) had already capitalised on the inability of the Party to present a united 
line on conscription and the use of conscripted troops. This inability was, as with the 
conscription debate, presented to the public as proof that they would run out on the American 
Alliance and leave Australia by itself in the „fight against communism‟, and this cost the ALP 
the 1966 election. These struggles of the ALP would only be exacerbated by the Presidential 
visit in October and the onset of the official election campaign in November of 1966 
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V 
„All The Way With LBJ‟ 
 
Following his appointment as Prime Minister in January 1966 Harold Holt received a cable 
from his American counterpart congratulating him on succeeding Menzies; in response Holt 
reiterated a „long-standing‟ invitation for L.B.J to visit Australia in the hopes that the offer 
would finally be accepted.
141
 It took almost eight months but in early October LBJ finally 
accepted the invitation to visit Australia, and following an announcement of the impending 
visit in the Australian Parliament Holt sent the following to the President: 
 
„The only really sour note has come from Senator Keefe, the Federal President of the 
Labor Party, who charges me with a political motive in pressing you to visit us. This 
recalled to my mind the comment of a former colleague of mine about one of his critics, 
that he would find politics in the Lord‟s Prayer.‟142 
 
Holt‟s comical cable and Keefe‟s comment, demonstrate the most obvious way that the 
American Alliance affected the election in 1966. On the threshold of the official election 
campaign period, the first American President ever to visit Australia whilst in office arrived. 
LBJ created a sensation within Australia, thousands packed the streets to catch a glimpse of 
the American in scenes which surpassed those of the Royal visit of 1963.
143
 LBJ‟s visit was 
the main feature of the 1966 campaign, and following LBJ‟s departure America stayed very 
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much at the forefront of the election, which is to be expected given the importance placed on 
Vietnam and conscription. All major political parties made statements regarding Australia‟s 
alliances, particularly the American Alliance and the security it could, or could not provide.  
 
Whilst the official campaign period began after LBJ had left Australia, the visit occurred only 
a month before the election (from October 20
th
 through to October 23
rd
) meaning it is 
perfectly reasonable to include in the campaign period. Certainly at the time sections of the 
media and the ALP thought the timing of the visit was suspect, and the effect of the visit on 
voters has been debated by various historians. Paul Williams considers the visit to have been 
a highlight of the American Alliance, but inconsequential on the election outcome. Williams 
certainly provides compelling evidence for his argument, having performed a comparative 
study on how individuals in electorates where LBJ did and did not visit voted. Williams‟ 
findings show that there was not a significantly larger swing to the LCP in the states LBJ 
visited, and in fact the highest swing to the LCP occurred in South Australia which LBJ did 
not visit.
144
 Williams‟ findings are backed up by historians Overacker and Albinski both of 
whom agree that the visit did little to boost LCP votes. Overacker certainly attempts to 
demonstrate the validity of this by pointing out that support for Vietnam, conscription, and 
Holt‟s government remained high throughout 1966 (as evidenced by Gallup Polls) and not 
just in the weeks after LBJ‟s visit.145 Albinski feels that it is impossible to establish the 
weight of the visit on the election outcome, even though Williams and Overacker have 
attempted to demonstrate the immediate effects.
146
 However Albinski does concede that 
whilst the visit may not have had an immediate effect on the voting patterns of Australians it 
certainly contributed to the appearance of an ALP split (as discussed in the previous chapter, 
Calwell gave in to the public support for LBJ and issued a statement in favour of the visit 
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whilst the ALP Federal President issued one against it) which did have an effect on the 
election outcome.
147
  
 
The view that the visit did not affect the election is contested by public commentators such as 
Ray Aitchison and to a lesser extent historian Paul Ham, as well as by ALP politicians who 
were in parliament during 1966. Aitchison considered the visit to be a „deliberate and 
brilliant‟ piece of electioneering by Holt and is in no doubt that the visit gave Holt and the 
LCP a considerable electoral advantage.
148
 Ham calls the visit a „calculated triumph‟, and if 
the visit itself had no effect on the election then he suggests that the spike in media support 
for a Prime Minister who was able to bring one of the most powerful world leaders to 
Australia certainly did.
149
 The media in particular was overwhelmingly enthusiastic about this 
visit, and the extent of this enthusiasm is discussed later in this chapter. Serving members of 
the ALP certainly had no doubts about the intentions of the visit, with views of individuals 
such as Senator Keefe being loud enough for Holt to report to LBJ prior to his arrival. Fred 
Daly, another long serving ALP Member of Parliament, stated in his autobiography that: 
 
„The visit was perfectly timed – almost on the eve of the elections. It was the first time 
in Australia that such a personality has been used so unscrupulously – and allowed 
himself to be – for political purposes. Holt was as good as elected the day LBJ 
departed.‟150 
 
This view was certainly shared by almost all in the ALP with Senator John Wheeldon asking 
in Parliament during October if: 
                                                 
147
 Albinski, Politics and Foreign Policy in Australia, p.65. 
148
 Aitchison, From Bob to Bungles & Now to Billy, p.29. 
149
 Ham, Vietnam, The Australian War, p.268-270. 
150
 Daly, From Curtin to Kerr, p.179. 
 56 
 
„the Government's invitation to President Johnson to visit Australia at this time means 
that there is to be a change of election practice by the Liberal Party, and that in future, 
instead of members of the British Royal family, American politicians will be invited to 
this country to support the Liberal Party's election campaigns?‟151. 
 
Even LBJ and Holt were aware that the timing of the visit appeared suspect, with LBJ stating 
in an October cable that: 
 
„I have very much in mind the fact that you will be facing elections in November, and I 
believe it will be possible to make the visit a friendly and rewarding exchange between 
allies and friends without any partisan implication.‟152 
 
The shared ALP view that the visit was nothing more than a shrewd political attempt by Holt 
to garner more support is certainly understandable, particularly in light of Wheeldon‟s quote 
which points out that in the past the Liberal Party had closely aligned themselves with the 
British Monarchy in previous elections to their advantage.
153
 However the work of historians 
such as Williams, combined with LBJ‟s clear desire to keep the visit apolitical makes the 
argument that the visit did not affect the election outcome considerably more persuasive.  
 
The effect of the visit considered, LBJ‟s trip to Australia did actually serve an official 
purpose, as it was a predecessor to the South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO, 
discussed later) Manila Conference which occurred during late October. This conference was 
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focused on showing a „united front‟ by the SEATO allies involved in the defence of South 
Vietnam. Aitchison, who as previously discussed felt the visit was Holt‟s „trump card‟, 
concedes that by timing the visit right before the Manila Conference Holt and LBJ were able 
to engage in „top level‟ conferences to ensure that they were agreed on vital matters relating 
to the Vietnam War prior to Manila.
154
 In addition to conferences between Holt and LBJ the 
trade deals between Australia and America were made behind closed doors during the visit, 
with Holt gaining agreements on the export of Australian wheat and lamb, such deals were 
however kept quiet due to fear of what Edwards calls „blood for dollars‟ accusations.155  
 
The media response to the visit was phenomenal, and as mentioned previously historians such 
as Ham feel that the visit allowed for a „spike‟ in pro-LCP press coverage. Every major 
newspaper published articles on the Australian-American relationship, examining areas such 
as defence cooperation, learning exchanges, and in The Sydney Morning Herald there was 
even an explanation of how the American government was voted in and worked.
156
 Closer to 
the date of the visit headlines such as „A Million Hooray‟s For L.B.J‟ began to appear, with 
stories focusing on parade routes and the issuing of free American and Australian flags for 
spectators during the visit.
157
 There are mixed messages from the Australian media regarding 
their opinion on the effect of the visit. Certainly there was plenty of noise made about the 
comings and goings of the visit with coverage of a luncheon in Parliament by The Australian, 
one leg of the visit was televised live over several television stations, and even some focus on 
the itinerary of LBJ‟s wife during the visit.158 In addition LBJ clearly managed to „seduce‟ 
sections of the media, with the Sydney Morning Herald stating that „[the] tall, tanned leader 
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shows magnetism, mastery of words‟.159 But very little noise was made by the press about the 
possibility of Holt using the Presidential visit to his advantage. One of the few instances of 
the media directly questioning the timing of the visit is found in a cartoon by Aubrey 
Collette, the political cartoonist for The Australian who produced many iconic images on the 
American Alliance. One such cartoon was published on the 21
st
 of October 1966 (fig 4.), it 
featured a grinning Holt in a wedding gown being carried over the „election threshold‟ by his 
groom, LBJ. Calwell is pictured throwing „protest‟ confetti on the happy couple while 
ranking members of the Holt administration look on with pride.
160
 It would be almost 
impossible to misinterpret what Collette is implying, that LBJ did affect the popularity of the 
LCP and consequently the election outcome. What we can gather from the media coverage 
afforded to the visit is that Ham‟s conclusion is correct. While LBJ‟s visit may not have had a 
direct impact on the election, the clear pro-LBJ stance of the media carried onto a pro-Holt 
stance. This implied to the Australian public that the American Alliance was considerably 
stronger in the hands of the LCP, particularly given the friendly way LBJ interacted with Holt 
in comparison to Calwell (which became considerably more pronounced during the visit 
when Calwell managed to anger LBJ during his welcome speech). 
 
LBJ most certainly helped increase Holt‟s public profile and popular appeal as head of the 
LCP. On repeated occasions during the visit the President would place a hand on Holts 
shoulder and tell the adoring Australian public, „look, this is your Prime Minister‟.161 The 
condescending nature of this comment was not questioned, but it allowed Holt to claim a kind 
of „special relationship‟ with LBJ and gave him the appearance of being LBJ‟s man in 
Australia. LBJ even offered Australians a response to Holt‟s infamous „Australia will be all 
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the way with LBJ‟.162 LBJ stated during his Canberra leg of the visit that „[he] LBJ is with 
Australia all the way‟.163 He went on to state that: 
 
„There is not a boy wearing uniform yonder today who does not know that when 
freedom is at stake, when brave men stand shoulder to shoulder in battle, Australia will 
go all the way – and America will go all the way – not part of the way, not a third of the 
way, not three parts of the way but all the way.
164
 
 
This was a bold statement of support for the Menzies/Holt policies of engagement in 
Vietnam, which was particularly interesting to Australians given that the best Calwell could 
muster in response was stating that „We [the ALP] will do our best to maintain our alliances 
and to observe our treaties at all times.‟165 It should be noted that LBJ‟s „all the way‟ 
comment and clear support for the LCP was in response to Calwell‟s welcome speech. 
Calwell had angered LBJ by bringing up the divisions over the Vietnam War in both 
American society and politics (including in LBJ‟s own Party). Calwell had quoted President 
Abraham Lincoln, and addition he called upon the views of President J.F. Kennedy, Senators 
Fulbright, Mansfield, Robert and Edward Kennedy, and twenty four others who shared the 
same views as the ALP on involvement in Vietnam.
166
 By reminding LBJ that politics in his 
home country were not united on the issue in Vietnam Calwell apparently infuriated LBJ 
which in turn lead to LBJ‟s blatant support for Holt over Calwell. 
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 ______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Holt‟s election policy speech for the Liberal Party covered all of the expected issues for a 
sitting government. Domestic issues, such as the continuation of the popular School Science 
Block program instituted under Menzies (how this program affected the ALP in the lead up to 
the election is discussed in the previous chapter), a redevelopment of the social service 
program through a liberalisation of means testing and national development schemes for rural 
and tourism industries were all covered by Holt before he moved onto issues of foreign 
policy.
167
  
 
In announcing policy proposals for external relations Holt stressed the Liberal Parties 
commitment to its alliances, including the American Alliance and SEATO. This second 
treaty, which is alternately referred to as the Manilla Pact, was a collective defence pact 
signed by Australia, New Zealand, America, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, France and 
the United Kingdom. South Vietnam was not a member but was offered military protection 
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under the treaty due to the strong anti-communist ideals behind the pact.
168
  The Liberal Party 
stressed the importance of honouring the obligations it had to other nations under ANZUS 
and SEATO, particularly given that South Vietnam was offered military protection under the 
latter and was „threatened‟ by the communist North Vietnam. This, along with the ongoing 
battle to „keep communism off Australian shores‟ meant that the Liberal Party was in a strong 
position to rationalise their decisions to introduce conscription and commit forces in Asia. 
Holt introduced the importance of alliances in the opening of his explanation of Liberal Party 
foreign policy, informing Australians that: 
 
„Our foreign policy is based on the beliefs we have about the kind of Australia all of us 
want to see and about the kind of society we want to build and preserve here...So we 
have joined with others in paying a price for the freedoms we hope to retain‟169 
 
He furthered this concept stating that as a government the Liberal Party Government had: 
 
„...sought, above all things, to keep our country at peace; but to have some assurance 
that Australia will have strong and reliable friends.‟170  
 
What Holt and the Liberal Party were stressing was alliance loyalty; Australia should not and 
could not stand alone in the defence of its region. Alliances, particularly with the Americans, 
were the answer.  
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Why Australia was in (and must stay in) Vietnam and required conscription for this effort 
was certainly an important question which had to be answered during the election by the 
Liberal (and Country) Party, was Australia there because America wanted it to be? Or was 
Australia there to keep America interested in defending the region? America certainly 
realised why Australia was so keen for American involvement in Asia, Woodard comments 
that as early as 1965 the American government saw Australian commitment to Vietnam as an 
attempt to keep American influence in the region.
171
 But by early 1966 this argument appears 
to have carried very little weight, and the concept of staying in Vietnam because America 
needed Australia to be there is supported by considerably more historians than Woodard‟s 
stance. Certainly the introduction of conscripts in the Australian contribution signalled that 
Australia was capable of building up a sizable defence force and therefore negating the „need‟ 
to have American troops in the region, however the view that Australia no longer desired 
American influence is incorrect. By 1966 the Australian Government was still 
overwhelmingly concerned about Chinese aggression, and saw American involvement in the 
region as a plausible way to keep the aggression in check. It would be more correct to argue 
that by 1966 Australia was in Vietnam for both reasons. Conscription for the LCP was linked 
to America as it was national defence. Pemberton argues that the lack of enthusiastic military 
assistance in Vietnam for America from the other SEATO allies (until late 1966) meant that 
the pressure on Australia, and therefore Holt, to provide more troops was immense.
172
 
Jordens agrees with Pemberton, pointing out that Menzies‟ introduction of conscription 
occurred almost in secrecy due to the fear that diplomatic repercussions over the inability to 
provide adequate troop numbers in joint military actions would be greater than the 
repercussions with the Australian public.
173
 Pemberton‟s argument certainly stems from the 
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Liberal policy speech of 1966, giving it considerably more credence than Woodard‟s, with 
Holt stressing the need for keeping conscripted troops in Vietnam, stating that: 
 
„Withdrawal of national servicemen from Vietnam, as intended by the Labor Party, 
would render our task force ineffective and seriously disrupt the Army. It would 
inevitably mean loss of confidence in Australia by its allies‟.174 
 
Clearly the image the Liberal Party was presenting to Australia was will (the Liberal 
Party) we be loyal and more importantly they made it very clear that the Labor Party 
would not be.  
 
The ALP‟s election policy speech for 1966, delivered by Calwell, made it very clear from 
its opening what they felt the election was on: 
 
„The most important issue in this campaign is Conscription, the conscription of a 
section of our twenty years old youths, against their wishes and their wills, to kill or be 
killed in the undeclared, civil war in Vietnam and the threatened extension of 
conscription to all twenty year olds and other age groups to increase our unwarranted 
and unnecessary commitment.‟175 
 
Calwell did not even attempt to open his speech with an explanation of domestic policy, and 
his previously mentioned emotional approach to the matter of conscription dominated the 
first few minutes of the policy speech. This was a major problem from Calwell, as he had 
misread the electorate completely and was effectively „preaching to the converted‟ by making 
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his policy speech a speech on conscription. Albinski certainly agrees with this argument, 
suggesting that the „old Calwellian stress on battling against conscription‟ had become an old 
and tired battle in the minds of Australians, further to this Albinski suggests that the idea of 
withdrawing troops after they had been committed was an unsavoury idea to many.
176
 Both of 
these arguments are supported by the Gallup Poll data which has been referenced in chapter 
two, which shows that Australians were in support of conscription, and Vietnam.  
 
Calwell‟s policy speech did briefly touch on education funding, schemes aimed at national 
development, a proposed national referendum to allow an ALP government to take control 
over prices and interest rates and various proposals aimed at „looking out for‟ Aboriginals, 
veterans and workers.
177
 But as stated, Calwell was keen to keep the focus of ALP policy on 
conscription, and rapidly brought his speech back to the matter. Whilst announcing ALP 
intentions for external relations Calwell announced plans to scrap conscription as it currently 
stood in favour for the previously discussed CMF and urged Australians to see how 
„immoral‟ conscription was. He announced that:  
 
„there are 600,000 Australian mothers with sons between 15 and 20 years of age, and 
many of these boys could be sent away to die or be wounded in the long, cruel, dirty 
war that is Vietnam. I call on those 600,000 mothers and their husbands and their other 
sons and daughters to tell Mr Holt that the lives of their eligible sons are too precious to 
be squandered by the man who has pledged to go all the way with L.B.J.‟178 
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Emotion was clearly Calwell‟s answer to the Liberal‟s push for loyalty. It had been since his 
1965 speech, when he lambasted the decision of the Menzies‟ Government to commit to the 
conflict in Vietnam. By appealing to the mothers and fathers whose sons could be drafted and 
killed Calwell had clearly hoped to negate Holt‟s claims that ALP plans for withdrawing 
conscripts were anti-American and anti-alliance.  
 
Election posters produced by the ALP often focused on how conscription could take away a 
family member. A particularly popular poster titled (see fig 1.) Conscription will take your 
son – Sooner or Later, featured an ominous officer in a stance usually reserved for recruiting 
posters (such as fig 5.) and was clearly designed to elicit an emotional response. It is almost 
impossible to find ALP campaign material that does not seek to bring up the conscription 
issue, however in an odd attempt to dispel the anti-American Alliance label they had been 
given the ALP did produce a series of pamphlets under the heading of This President said.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
____________________________________________________________ 
Fig 5. 
Leete, Alfred, „Your Country Needs You‟, London 
Opinion, 5 September 1914, cover image.  
 
Fig 1. 
The Australian Labor Party. „Conscription will take your son‟ 
The West Australian, Saturday November 12, 1966, p.15. 
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Under this heading the ALP quoted LBJ‟s predecessor, President John Kennedy, who had 
said that he felt Vietnam was an unwinnable war for America.
179
. The ALP utilised this and 
in an attempt to demonstrate that they were actually for the American Alliance included the 
following in the This President Said campaign:  
 
„The Labor views on Vietnam are supported by opinions expressed by the late President 
J. F. Kennedy and by other distinguished Americans like his two famous brothers, 
Senators Robert and Edward Kennedy, and by Senators Fulbright and Mike Mansfield 
and twenty four other outstanding senators.‟180  
 
The wording of this pamphlet was taken directly from Calwell‟s welcome speech to LBJ in 
October, and served to remind Australians that the American‟s were just as divided on the 
issue of Vietnam as the LCP and ALP were. This was a clear example of the ALP fighting 
against the anti-American label the LCP had given them. And more importantly it 
demonstrated to Australians there was more than one kind of America. The LCP‟s election 
material and Alliance attitudes reveal that they saw America as a nation of military might 
capable of providing Australia with the defence the LCP craved. Calwell‟s statements 
however demonstrated that there was an America outside of this military power, one which 
shared the views of the ALP on the futility of the Vietnam War. While this attempt at 
bringing other (that is, non LBJ) American views into play may have helped „tone down‟ the 
anti-American image the LCP had managed to place on the ALP the fact was that the 
emotional way Calwell appealed to the anti-conscription vote overshadowed it. Slogans such 
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as „your vote will decide whether more 20-year-olds are to be sent to war in Vietnam‟ failed 
to capture popularity in an election filled with pro-American Alliance material.
181
 
 
Calwell‟s own statements did little to encourage voters that they would do „what was needed‟ 
to protect the American Alliance. As early as July of 1966 Calwell went on record on his 
ideas about Australian commitment under the American Alliance, and in response to Holt‟s 
phrase „all the way with LBJ‟ stated that: 
„I [Calwell] was never more sickened than when I read the utter nonsense by Mr. Holt 
the other day – “we‟ll go all the way with LBJ.” Who does he think he is fooling? No 
nation can pledge itself to the complete support of another country whether it is 
consulted or not. That‟s not the spirit of nationalism – it‟s unadulterated 
sycophancy.‟182 
 
Statements such as this would haunt Calwell during the 1966 campaign and, as discussed in 
the previous chapter, Calwell‟s own deputy would attempt to downplay such concepts. But 
the result of both Calwell‟s statements and ALP attempts to down play them resulted in 
election material such as that seen in fig 6. This pamphlet, produced by the DLP (which was 
formed as a result of an ALP split in 1955) is very clear in its wording, and stresses the „anti-
American and anti-alliance intentions‟ of the ALP.  Election ads such as this destroyed the 
credibility of the ALP, as they forced Calwell to issue statements which clearly conflicted 
with ideas he had presented to the public before the campaign period. Take Calwell‟s 
previously discussed statements during the LBJ visit, which were in clear conflict with the 
statement above. The uphill battle faced over the conscription debate was only made steeper 
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for the ALP as they failed to push away claims by their rivals that they would damage the 
American Alliance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________________________________________________ 
Fig 6. 
The Democratic Labor Party. Think Carefully, election pamphlet (Potts Point: Braddon 
Printing Pty Ltd, 1966).   
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The election campaign of 1966 demonstrated once and for all the ability of the American 
Alliance to impact upon an election result. The LBJ visit was an absolute success for the 
LCP; LBJ encouraged and pledged support for LCP policies in Vietnam. Which provided 
 
 
 
 
Australians with welcome reassurance about the decisions of the sitting Government. The 
campaign itself was populated with pro-Alliance and pro-America messages from all sides of 
politics. However it was the LCP‟s strong defensive Alliance message which hit home the 
hardest. The ALP‟s pledge to bring home conscripts and end conscription did not sit well in a 
nation in which fear of Chinese aggression was overwhelmingly strong. The American 
Alliance combined with continued conscription were the answer to the fears of many 
Australians, and this was reflected in the LCP victory of 1966. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 70 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
 
There can be little doubt that the American Alliance and how it was used by the Holt 
government as a test of loyalty and commitment to Australian security clearly had an impact 
on the outcome of the 1966 Australian Federal Election. Holt and the LCP were returned to 
office with a landslide victory, gaining eleven of the twelve seats lost by the ALP.
183
 Menzies 
election result of 1963 had been considered phenomenal with the LCP gaining eleven seats, 
and giving the coalition seventy-two seats to the ALP‟s fifty. But Holt‟s 1966 victory 
surpassed expectations, and after the election of 1966 the LCP had eighty-two seats to the 
ALP‟s forty-one. The American Alliance coloured the conscription debate, featured in the 
ALP‟s fracturing and allowed for the first Australian tour of an American President. 
 
Debates surrounding conscription throughout the 1966 election heavily featured the 
importance of Australia fully committing to any alliance in order to maintain its positive 
relations with its allies. The LCP made no attempts to hide that the ally in question was the 
United States, with the leader of the Country Party, John McEwen, having stated on national 
radio that: 
 
„To say that we would honour our obligations with the United States and our other 
allies only if enough volunteers came forward would show Australia as a very uncertain 
ally.‟184 
 
Loyalty was key in this statement, as McEwen was clearly informing Australian‟s that the 
ALP‟s pledge to remove not only national service personnel but all serving members of the 
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Australian defence force would make Australia appear immensely disloyal to the Americans. 
The DLP took a more blatant route when explaining why conscription for Vietnam was 
necessary, an election pamphlet titled Which Way to Freedom informed Australians that:  
 
„Since World War II, Australia‟s defence and security have depended on American 
assistance. Reject political parties whose policies weaken this Alliance. The American 
presence in South-East Asia shields the regional Alliance of free nations, on which our 
security depends. We cannot expect protection in future if we withdraw from the 
common struggle now.‟185 
 
It was a very simple message being offered by the LCP (and the DLP), a vote for them would 
be a vote for the defence of Australia. And more importantly if Australia was to contribute to 
its alliances then it must be able to field a significant defence force in shared conflicts. 
Therefore it was reasonable for the LCP to declare that if Australia was to be loyal 
conscription must be kept. The ALP however was adamant that conscription was not the 
answer to maintaining Australia‟s defence treaties, telling Australians that it was immoral to 
conscript young men „against their wishes and wills‟.186 However the fact that most 
Australian‟s supported conscription for young men (as evidenced by the poll‟s discussed in 
chapter three) in the first place meant that by arguing against it the ALP had misread the 
opinions of the majority of Australians of voting age. The LCP successfully associated 
conscription with Alliance strength, pushing the concept that ending conscription posed high 
risk to the security of the nation.  
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Further to this the LCP was able to successfully play on the visible disunity within the ALP 
during the election year. Election material told Australians that it was their choice; they could 
opt for „a Holt Government united on this great issue [conscription for Vietnam to support the 
American Alliance] or a Labor Party confused and divided.‟187 The various differing opinions 
regarding conscription within the ALP only served to destabilise the party when made public. 
Calwell and Whitlam in particular confused the Australian public by offering different 
statements on not only how troop withdrawal would occur, but also which troops specifically 
would be brought back. Five days out from the election the two were still bickering on the 
matter, with Whitlam declaring that regulars (non conscripts) would stay in Vietnam while 
Calwell announced that all service personnel would be withdrawn.
188
 The division of the ALP 
over where they stood on the American Alliance was made very clear during the immensely 
popular LBJ visit, when Calwell‟s own „welcoming‟ stance was rejected by the ALP‟s federal 
president. The damage done by this was enormous as it demonstrated to the Australian public 
that the ALP was fracturing at the highest levels. If it was unable to manage the upper levels 
of the Party then it was reasonable for the public to assume that as a government it would be 
unable to control its rank-and-file, leading to a situation where everyday government 
functions were impossible. More importantly if the ALP was unable to control itself then, as 
the LCP suggested, they would be unable to control Australia‟s major alliances.  
 
The LBJ visit itself was a clear indicator of the strong influence that the American Alliance 
exerted upon the 1966 election. The incredible public support for an American President was 
in stark contrast to the lacklustre support given to the Royal visit only three years previously. 
Australians lined the streets to see LBJ, who was so powerful during the visit that very few 
questioned why was acceptable for him to place a hand on the Prime Ministers shoulder and 
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announce to the crowd, „look, this is your Prime Minister‟ on more than one occasion. Even 
LBJ‟s arrogant statement of „I like to come out and look my Prime Ministers over‟ failed to 
alienate the Australian public.
189
 But what the LCP actually gained out of their use of the 
American Alliance during the election is questionable. Minor trade deals were certainly made 
during the LBJ visit and the LCP certainly received some short term advantages but it is clear 
that in the long term very little was gained. In the short term the LCP gained an election 
victory by exploiting the strength of the alliance. Harold Holt‟s profile was lifted by the extra 
exposure he gained during LBJ‟s visit. This gave both he and the LCP a modern image over 
Calwell who, having previously lost two elections, appeared exceedingly old and out of 
touch. In addition LBJ‟s vocal support for Australian involvement in Vietnam (whilst at the 
same time refraining from publicly asking for an increased involvement) gave it considerably 
more credibility in a population who already largely supported the conflict.  
 
However long term gains for the LCP and their association with the American Alliance are 
few and far between. LBJ withdrew from the American Presidential race in 1968, and his 
Party (the Democratic Party) would lose the election to the Republican Party led by Richard 
Nixon. Nixon had campaigned on policy of „peace with honour‟ for Vietnam. A policy that 
he quickly began to implement, with preliminary steps being made in 1969.
190
 In June 1969 
Nixon introduced the Guam Doctrine (also known as the Nixon Doctrine), announcing that 
America would not commit ground troops for the defence of its allies if they were attacked.
191
 
Nixon further explained this Doctrine in November of 1969, stating the following:  
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„First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments. Second, we shall 
provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of 
a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security. Third, in cases involving 
other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when 
requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation 
directly.‟192     
  
These words posed a significant dilemma for Australia given the strength Holt had placed on 
the ANZUS Treaty‟s ability to protect. The problem for Australia was that neither ANZUS 
nor SEATO explicitly stated that America had to commit ground troops in the event of 
Australia being attacked. The promises of 1966 that a commitment in Vietnam would ensure 
protection under the American Alliance were tremendously damaged by the Guam Doctrine. 
In addition to this blow the British government‟s decision to begin integrating with the 
European Economic Community and withdraw militarily from East of Suez meant that 
Australia was in an increasingly fragile environment.
193
 More disturbing for Holt‟s successor, 
Prime Minister John Gorton was that under the Doctrine America began to withdraw troops 
from Vietnam without consulting the Australian Government. Immediately following his 
June 1969 announcement of the Guam Doctrine Nixon announced that 25,000 American 
troops would be withdrawn from the conflict in Vietnam.
194
 The move took the Gorton 
Government completely by surprise, as did a further announcement that 35,000 more troops 
would be withdrawn in September of 1969.
195
 Desperate for information on Nixon‟s long 
term withdrawal plans so that any Australian withdrawals would be the result of joint 
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Australian-American planning Gorton rang Nixon on December 15 of 1969. Gorton, 
expecting an invitation to Washington to facilitate conferences on joint withdrawal plans, was 
informed that should Australia wish to make a troop withdrawal announcement then they 
should, no joint planning would be necessary.
196
 The following day Nixon announced a third 
American withdrawal of 50,000 troops. Unable to extract firm plans for further American 
withdrawals, and in an attempt to ease the increasing anti-war sentiment in Australia, Gorton 
announced that an Australian battalion would be brought home by April 1970.
197
An 
Australian visit by Nixon‟s Vice-President Spiro Agnew in January 1970 offered even less 
assurances for the value of the LCP‟s promotion of the American Alliance as the future of 
Australian security. Following questions on weather America would let South Vietnam fall to 
communism Agnew reported that: 
 
„he [Agnew] could understand Australia‟s desire to get precise reactions but he could 
not say more than that response would be determined at the particular time.‟198  
 
In a disturbingly short amount of time the assurances Holt gave the Australian public about 
the value of fighting in Vietnam to keep American Alliance strong were gone. 
 
Further to this Gorton‟s successor William McMahon was left completely in the dark when 
America, again under Nixon, in 1971 broke the cold war ice on relations with China, the very 
nation the LCP was terrified of in the „battle against communism‟. One of the most iconic 
images of 1966 was the LCP‟s It’s your choice pamphlet (fig 2 and 3) which featured an 
image of a „red push‟ towards Australia, the bulk of the push presented in this ad is clearly 
coming from China. But in 1972 Nixon went to China, at the time America still recognised 
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the government of the Republic of China, based in Taiwan, as the true Chinese government 
and still would until 1979. However the visit presented Nixon with an opportunity for: 
  
„reducing the chance in the immediate future of a confrontation between the United 
States and the PRC in Asia, such as we [America] had in Korea, and such as we had 
indirectly in Vietnam.‟199 
 
As evidenced by the above statement, Nixon clearly saw a future in forging a relationship 
with China. As with the American troop withdrawals the announcement on July 15 1971 that 
Nixon would be visiting China the following year took the LCP government by complete 
surprise.
200
 In this instance the surprise was compounded by the fact that for the LCP had 
spent the previous week hurling abuse at Whitlam for leading a Labor delegation on a China 
visit in early July. McMahon himself had stated that: 
 
„I find it incredible that at a time when Australian soldiers are still engaged in Vietnam, 
the Leader of the Labor Party is becoming a spokesman for those against whom we are 
fighting.‟201 
 
Nixon‟s announcement that he would go to China not only made the LCP appear out of 
touch, but made it very clear that there was minimal communication occurring between he 
and the Australian Prime Minister. The American Alliance which had appeared in October 
1966 to be one of great intimacy instead was shown to have clear limits and liabilities. The 
Guam Doctrine had shattered the belief that American military would defend Australia and 
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Nixon‟s announcement of his China visit signalled that America was moving on from its fear 
of communism.  
 
This thesis has demonstrated that the American Alliance clearly impacted upon the 1966 
Australian Federal Election. 1966 was the high point in Australian-American relations; 
indeed the majority of the election was run on the need to protect the strength of the 
American Alliance. When the ALP decided to make the election about conscription, the LCP 
said that a failure to increase the size of the defence force would demonstrate a lack of 
commitment to her allies. When the ALP criticised Holt for stating that Australia was „all the 
way with LBJ‟ the LCP was able to point out that LBJ had declared that „Australia will go all 
the way – and America will go all the way.‟ When Calwell declared conscription to be 
immoral the LCP was able to point to the polls that indicated that Australians were for it. The 
integrity of the ALP was called into question when it was unable to present the Australian 
public with a united front. Above all the LBJ visit and LBJ‟s clear support for the LCP 
allowed Holt to promote his Party as the Party who kept the American Alliance safe. But with 
the release of the Guam Doctrine in 1969 Australians were left wondering why they had been 
loyal to an Alliance which never formally offered them any protection. Australians faced the 
uncomfortable dilemma that their entire Cold War policy – the desire to keep the Americans 
engaged in South East Asia, was on the point of collapse. The exploitation of the value of the 
American Alliance may have won Harold Holt his election in 1966, but following the 
election when the glamour of the relationship began to fade it was clear that the Alliance 
offered Australia and Australians very little.   
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